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COMMENT
Vote or Lose:
An Analysis of Decision-Making Alternatives
for the World Trade Organization
DMITRI V. VERENYOVt
"When partners can't agree,
Their business fairs disastrously;
With worry all the while, they get no further on ......
- Ivan Andreevich Krylov, Swan, Pike and Crab'
t J.D., State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law, 2003. I would
like to thank my parents for their continuous love, encouragement, and support.
I would also like to thank my professors, Makau Mutua and Amy Westbrook,
for their very helpful suggestions on earlier drafts of this Comment. All
mistakes, of course, are mine.
1. E.g., KRYLov's FABLES 120 (Bernard Pares trans., Hyperion Press 1977);
NIKOLAY STEPANOV, IVAN KRYLOV 129 (Twayne Publishers 1973). Swan, Pike
and Crab was also published in numerous editions in the language of the
original. E.g., I.A. KRYLOV, BASNI 102 (Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR 1956);
I.A. KRYLOV, IZBRANNYE SOCHINENIYA 188 (Detskaya Literatura 1969); 2 I.A.
KRYLOV, SOCHINENIYA 79 (Khudozhestvennaya Literatura 1969).
This very famous nineteenth century fable by Ivan Andreevich Krylov
involves the swan, the pike, and the crab trying to pull a cart together.
However, "their very nature and self-interest soon destroy any chances of
teamwork and trust succeeding." Michael Blankenheim, Banking-American
Style, INDEP. BANKER, Oct. 2001, available at http://www.fsvc.org/news/InThe
Press.asp?FilterUID=106 (last visited Mar. 10, 2003). In the end, "[tihe cart
goes nowhere because the swan wants to fly in the air, the pike wants to swim
underwater and the crayfish wants to crawl backward." Id.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the more difficult problems in the law of
international organizations-if not the most difficult one-
is the decision-making process.2 The great amount of
attention that governments and commentators give to the
formulation of appropriate rules of voting procedure for
international organizations3 indicates that this problem is
of utmost significance to successful international collective
action.4 In short, the choice of voting arrangements can
result in a strong and authoritative institution, whose
directives are respected and complied with, but can also
lead to one producing weak and unimplemented decisions,
if at all.
This Comment examines the present decision-making
rules in the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade'/World Trade Organization6  ("GATT/WTO") and
argues that, if the GATT/WTO is to be effective in the
future, these rules would have to be significantly reformed.
2. See, e.g., C. Wilfred Jenks, Unanimity, the Veto, Weighted Voting, Special
and Simple Majorities and Consensus as Modes of Decision in International
Organisations, in CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR
OF LORD McNAIR 48, 48 (1965) ("There is no more difficult problem confronting
international organisations today than that of evolving modes of taking
important decisions .... The problem has been a continuing one throughout the
history of international organisation and we are still far from having achieved
any satisfactory solution of it.").
3. See David Kennedy, A New Stream of International Law Scholarship, 7
WIS. INT'L L.J. 1, 42 (1988) ("People writing about institutional design in[international law] have devoted a great deal of energy to voting structure-the
allocation of votes among members or the voting configurations required for
action."); Stephen Zamora, Voting in International Economic Organizations, 74
AM. J. INT'L L. 566, 566 (1980) ("The importance of decisionmaking procedures
to successful international organization can be seen by the amount of attention
paid by governments to the adoption of appropriate rules of voting procedure for
new international organizations.").
4. See INIS L. CLAUDE JR., SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES: THE PROBLEMS AND
PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 111 (1965) (stating that, because
"the determination of the manner in which the international mind shall be
made up and words put in the international mouth is clearly a matter of utmost
significance[,]" the problem of voting poses "[clonstitutional issues of the first
importance for international organization").
5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
6. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994)
[hereinafter WTO Agreement].
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In general, all decision-making procedures employed by
international organizations can be classified as based either
on consensus or majority voting.8 Another important aspect
of procedures for taking decisions is the distinction between
the one nation-one vote and weighted voting systems.9
Finally, decisions of international organizations are taken
either as a "committee of the whole"-that is, by the entire
membership-or by a limited group of members.
In the GATT/WTO, which has always been faithful to
the one nation-one vote principle, taking its decisions as a
"committee of the whole,"" the basic agreements expressly
provide for the possibility of majority-based decision-
7. "Consensus" is generally defined as "[ain agreement of parties to the
same thing; a meeting of minds." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 299 (7th ed. 1999).
But see FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL
SETTING: DOCUMENTS, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 154 (1977) (noting that
"consensus" can be defined "broadly enough to include decisions made by at
least a substantial majority of the affirmative and negative votes cast").
Many distinguish between decision-making by consensus and unanimity.
See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 3, at 47 (noting that "these procedures are quite
dissimilar"). In this Comment, however, these terms are used interchangeably.
8. The majority-based decision-making techniques, in turn, can be further
divided into two major groups. First, a simple majority is "[a] majority of those
who actually vote in a particular election." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note
7, at 966. It is "the smallest possible majority which is more than half of the
votes counted." 2 HENRY G. SCHERMERS, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 337
(1972). Second, "[w]hen qualified majority is required, a proposal can only be
adopted by a percentage of the votes, always higher than a simple majority." Id.
The most common qualified majority is two-thirds. Id. at 352.
9. Under a one nation-one vote system, the voting powers of all members are
equal as each of them has one vote. By contrast, a weighted voting system is "a
system which assigns to members of international organizations votes
proportioned on the basis of predetermined relevant criteria. . . ." Elizabeth
McIntyre, Weighted Voting in International Organizations, 8 INT'L. ORG. 484,
484 (1954). See also Werner Feld & Robert Jordan, Patterns of Decisionmaking
in International Organizations, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS: PATTERNS AND INSIGHTS 117, 126 (Paul F. Diehl ed., 1989).
10. See GATT art. XXV:3 ("Each contracting party shall be entitled to have
one vote at all meetings of the CONTRACTING PARTIES."); WTO Agreement
art. IX:1 ("At meetings of the Ministerial Conference and the General Council,
each Member of the WTO shall have one 'vote. Where the European
Communities exercise their right to vote, they shall have a number of votes
equal to the number of their member States which are Members of the WTO.").
See also RAJ BHALA & KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAW: THE GATT-WTO
SYSTEM, REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, AND U.S. LAw 21 (1998) ("Voting in the WTO
follows the U.N. formula of one-member, one-vote (the EU holds a block of 15
votes, one for each of its member states).").
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making." Nevertheless, the practice of taking decisions by
consensus has been consistently followed throughout its
history. 2 What it translates into is that no decision can be
taken unless all members present at the meeting" express
no formal objection to it. 4
To examine the decision-making process in the
GATT/WTO, this Comment employs historical and com-
parative institutional approaches. An historical analysis of
voting rules prevailing in international organizations of the
world throughout the twentieth century shows that, over
time, preferences have been shifting between the rule of
unanimity/consensus and majority voting. 5 Nevertheless,
as pointed out by Inis Claude Jr., it appears that, overall,
"[tihe process of international organization has involved the
steady lifting of the dead hand of the unanimity rule."'6
This conclusion finds further support in a comparative
institutional approach, which shows that another important
economic organization-the European Union ("EU")"-has
been consistently moving away from the rule of consensus
toward decision-making based on qualified majority
voting. 8
11. Initially, a simple majority was the main rule of decision-making in the
GATT. See GATT art. XXV:4 ("Except as otherwise provided for in this
Agreement, decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall be taken by a
majority of the votes cast."). Under the WTO Agreement, however, "the matter
at issue shall be decided by voting" only "where a decision cannot be arrived at
by consensus ... ." WTO Agreement art. IX:1.
12. See, e.g., BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 21 (noting that, under the
GATT 1947, "there had not been a vote on a policy matter (other than waivers
and terms of accession) since 1959").
13. The most recent information on the members and observers of the WTO
is available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis_e/tif e/org6_e.htm
(last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
14. WTO Agreement art. IX:1 n.1 (defining "consensus": "[tihe body
concerned shall be deemed to have decided by consensus on a matter submitted
for its consideration, if no Member, present at the meeting when the decision is
taken, formally objects to the proposed decision").
15. See infra Part I.
16. CLAUDE, supra note 4, at 113 (arguing also that "[t]he history of
international organization is the story of efforts to achieve progressive
emancipation from the tradition-based rule of equality and unanimity").
17. "The European Union was formed as the European Economic
Community (EEC) by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, and later renamed the
European Community (EC)." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 7, at 575.
"The European Community became the European Union when the Maastricht
Treaty on European Union took effect in November 1993." Id.
18. See infra Part II.
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This Comment next considers decision-making
alternatives for the WTO. For the above reasons, the rule of
consensus appears to be inappropriate. As the number of
members in the WTO has increased,19 and is continuing to
increase," this rule proves to be too burdensome.2 With the
requirement that 145 members have no formal objection to
a decision before it can be taken, it is doubtful that the
WTO is going to be able to function effectively in the
future.22 At best, the rule of consensus could result in weak
decisions, diluted by the necessity of reaching a compromise
among many members with differing trade agendas.
A simple majority voting-the other rule expressly
provided for by the basic agreements2 -is a much worse
19. In 1947, when GATT was signed, there were only twenty-three
signatories. See, e.g., Jock A. Finlayson & Mark W. Zacher, The GATT and the
Regulation of Trade Barriers: Regime Dynamics and Functions, 35 INT'L ORG.
561 (1981). THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: PATrERNS AND
INSIGHTS, supra note 9, at 258, 259. As of February 5, 2003, the WTO counted
145 states among its members, and thirty-one other states were in the status of
observer. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
20. The two new members that recently joined the WTO-China and
Chinese Taipei--did so in November 2001, during the Fourth WTO Ministerial
Conference in Doha, Qatar. See China to Join on 11 December, Chinese Taipei's
Membership Also Approved, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/minist_e/
min01_e/min01_llnove.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2003). And, on February 5,
2003, Armenia became the 145th member of the WTO. See Republic of Armenia
and the WTO, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/countriese/armeniae.
htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
21. "The WTO still operates by consensus, but the process of 'consensus-
building' has broken down." Jeffrey J. Schott & Jayashree Watal, Decision-
Making in the WTO, in THE WTO AFTER SEATTLE 283, 284 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed.,
2000). One of the two main causes of this problem is that "WTO membership
has greatly expanded, encompassing many developing countries that previously
were outsiders or inactive players in trade negotiations." Id. "In sum, GATT
decision making worked in the past because there were fewer countries actively
engaged ...... Id. at 285.
22. STORMY MILDNER, INSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTIES: PROBLEMS WITHIN THE
WTO DECISION MAKING PROCESS, available at http://www.weltpolitik.net/policy-
forum/article/38.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2003). See also WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: TRADING INTO THE FUTURE 62 (2d rev. ed. 1999) (quoting Jeffrey
J. Schott: "The WTO will likely suffer from slow and cumbersome policy-making
and management-an organization with more than 120 member countries
cannot be run by a 'committee of the whole'), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/res-e/doloade/tif.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2003); Bruce Stokes, Not All
the Critics Were in the Streets, 31 NAT'L J. 3483, 3483 (1999) (noting that "[w]ith
134 disparate members-some of which account for a large chunk of world trade
and many of which rarely sell anything beyond their borders-the principle of
one nation, one vote hinders the institution's ability to act").
23. See supra note 11.
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alternative. Under the present one nation-one vote system,
its application would almost certainly lead to alienation of
super-powerful minorities.24 In such a situation, all the key
members, including the EU and United States, would be
better off withdrawing from the GATT/WTO.
A number of members and commentators have
proposed an Executive Committee-a smaller body within
the WTO with limited membership.2" One clear advantage
of this idea is that an Executive Committee provides for
more efficient decision-making. However, this advantage is
seriously undermined-if not completely negated-by the
fact that, under all these proposals, such an Executive
Committee would only have consensus building, and no
decision-making, powers. 6 Moreover, even if accepted, these
proposals appear to be similar to the prior practice of the
Consultative Group of Eighteen, 27 which had only limited
success.
28
24. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 311 (3d
ed. 1995) (noting that the broad language of Article XXV:1 of the GATT 1947
posed a danger to the United States because, "in a GATT with over 120
members, over two-thirds of which are developing countries, and over half of
which are formally associated in one status or another with the European
Union[,]" the United States "could have been [easily] outvoted .... ").
25. Some of these proposals came from the governments of Canada, Japan,
Mexico, and the European Union. See generally AMRITA NARLIKAR, WTO
DECISION-MAKING AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 16 (South Ctr., Trade-Related
Agenda, Dev. and Equity (T.R.A.D.E.), Working Paper No. 11, 2001) (discussing
the proposals made by these governments), available at http://www.southcentre
.org/publications/wtodecis/workingpapersll.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
There were also proposals by academics and publicists. See, e.g., Schott &
Watal, supra note 21, at 286 (proposing "[a] new, permanent management or
steering group" in order "to make WTO procedures more equitable and
efficient"); Stokes, supra note 22, at 3483 (proposing to streamline WTO
decision-making by creating "an inner council, made up of major trading powers
and representatives of other regions of the world, to make most WTO
decisions").
26. NARLIKAR, supra note 25, at 16.
27. The GATT Council established the Consultative Group of Eighteen in
1975. GATT Secretariat, The History of the Consultative Group of Eighteen,
MNT.GNG/NG14/W/5 (June 9, 1987). It was created to address the problem of
consensus-building that resulted from considerable increase in GATT
membership. See Martin A. McCrory & Eric L. Richards, Clearing the Air: The
Clean Air Act, GATT and the WTO's Reformulated Gasoline Decision, 17 UCLA
J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 17 n.116 (1998-1999). The eighteen members of the
Group "were selected to reflect the economic characteristics of GATT's total
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Based on the above analysis, this Comment argues that
a weighted, qualified majority voting system would be the
best decision-making alternative for the WTO. There are
several important advantages that such a decision-making
rule has vis-A-vis the other alternatives. First, the
weighting of votes would realistically reflect the relative
place of each individual member in international trade.29
The key members would probably have to be allocated
enough votes to have the right of veto. Second, the
flexibility of this rule would also allow the WTO to set the
percentage of votes cast necessary to constitute a qualified
majority."0 Together with distribution of votes, this
flexibility could be used to protect the interests of
developing countries. Admittedly, unlike under the rule of
consensus, these countries would have no right of veto.
However, the system can be so designed that a sufficient
number of developing countries, voting in concert, would be
able to block a decision they oppose.
As noted, this Comment examines the voting rules in
the WTO and assesses possible alternatives to those rules.
Part I briefly reviews the changes in attitudes toward
decision-making by unanimity, majority vote and consensus
over the last century. Part II then studies the evolution of
voting rules in the EU. It is followed by Part III, which
contains a similar analysis of voting rules in the
GATT/WTO. Finally, Part IV assesses advantages and
disadvantages of several decision-making procedures in the
context of the WTO. Again, this Comment concludes that, to
be an effective international institution in the future, the
WTO needs to abandon its rule of consensus as the main
decision-making procedure in favor of a wider use of
weighted, qualified majority voting.
membership." Id. "Led by GATT's Director-General, the Group of Eighteen met
several times a year to discuss major trade issues." Id.
28. See NARLIKAR, supra note 25, at 16.
29. See D.W. BOWETT, TmE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 357, 360 (3d
ed. 1975) (arguing that the rule of "one State-one vote" is "somewhat
unrealistic" and that "[tihe abandonment of the rule of unanimity, and the
movement towards the rule of majority, was a necessary pre-condition to the
development of voting techniques designed to represent States according to
their real interests").
30. As noted, the most common qualified majority is two-thirds. See supra
note 8. However, "[a] higher proportion of affirmative votes, such as three-
fourth or four-fifth, may be required." Jenks, supra note 2, at 54. "Other
formulae are no doubt conceivable." Id.
2003] 433
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I. CONSENSUS VERSUS MAJORITY VOTING IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
A. The Doctrine of Sovereign Equality and the Rule of
Unanimity
Historically, the idea of majority-based decision-making
was unheard-of in international practice. 1 Instead, the
question of voting in the conduct of international relations
was strongly influenced by the notion of state sovereignty,"2
which held that a state was immune from externally
imposed legislation.3 In the context of international
collective action, this fundamental principle of traditional
international law was promoted by the rule of unanimity
under a one nation-one vote system.34 The arguments in
31. See CLAUDE, supra note 4, at 111 ("Voting is a concept alien to the
traditional system for the management of international relations.... ."); Jenks,
supra note 2, at 49 (According to "the old diplomatic tradition[,] ... decisions at
any international meeting require[d] the agreement of all the participants.");
Zamora, supra note 3, at 571 ("The idea that nations acting in concert could
make decisions by majority vote was once alien to the conduct of international
relations.").
32. See, e.g., DEBIPROSAD PAL, STATE SOVEREIGNTY AT THE CROSS-ROADs 67
(1962) ("Sovereignty, in the meaning of an absolute, uncontrolled state ... is
the quicksand upon which the foundations of traditional international law have
been built up.").
33. See, e.g., PHILEMON BLISS, OF SOVEREIGNTY 6 (1885) ("In international
law .... a sovereign State is the equal of every other, and is not subject to
external control."); GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 64 (George W. Keeton & Georg Schwarzenberger eds., 5th ed. 1967)
("[S]overeignty means omnipotence[,] ... the claim.., to be... free from
external control."); A.K. PAVITHRAN, SUBSTANCE OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW,
WESTERN AND EASTERN 114 (1965) ("State sovereignty today can be defined as
independence of a State, expressed in its unequivocal right freely and at its own
discretion, to decide its internal and external affairs.... ."); JOVITO R. SALONGA
& PEDRO L. YAP, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 128 (3d ed. 1967) ("[Tjhe external
manifestation of sovereignty.., means the freedom of a State to conduct its
foreign affairs, free from outside control."); Oyvind Osterud, Sovereign
Statehood and National Self-Determination: A World Order Dilemma, in
SUBDUING SOVEREIGNTY: SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE 18, 19-20
(1994) ("Sovereignty is a formal condition which demands freedom form outside
interference[,] ... shielding formal decision making from external authorities.").
34. See WELLINGTON KOo, JR., VOTING PROCEDURES IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 8 (1947) ("In any discussion of voting procedures in
international organization, the twin dogmas of 'unanimity' and 'equality'
frequently serve to becloud the functional role of voting."). Thus, for example, at
the great conferences at The Hague in 1899 and 1907, and at the Paris Peace
Conference in 1919, the rule of unanimity applied to all really important
decisions. See BOWETT, supra note 29, at 358.
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favor of this decision-making arrangement usually stressed
three of its important virtues. First, the principle that no
member can be forced to live up to the obligations adopted
by others against its will encourages states to participate in
the organization more readily and actively.3 Second, the
rule of unanimity provides the best assurances for the
observance of sovereign equality." Finally, when decisions
can only be passed with the approval of each and every
member, it is more likely that they are going to be respected
and complied with.37
The Covenant of the League of Nations" is a good
example of adherence to the doctrine of state sovereignty.
The members of the League adopted a one nation-one vote
system, 9 with unanimity as the general rule of decision-
making.4° Thus, even though it was theoretically possible
that the small members could outvote the major powers, the
Covenant rendered the possibility of majority voting moot
41in most cases.
35. See 2 SCHERMERS, supra note 8, at 327 ("Many States will participate
more readily in an organization if they are sure that they will not be
outvoted.").
36. See Koo, supra note 34, at 9 ("With respect to the doctrine of unanimity,
its presence in an international organization has customarily been based.., on
the theory ... that the unanimity rule is the best assurance for the
maintenance of equality."); CROMWELL A. RICHES, MAJORITY RULE IN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: A STUDY OF THE TREND FROM UNANIMITY TO
MAJORITY DECISION 245 (1940) ("[Although the rule of unanimity can not be
said to be a consequence of the doctrine of state equality, its maintenance has
been supported frequently as the best assurance of the maintenance of that
equality.").
37. See 2 SCHERMERS, supra note 8, at 327 ("The implementation of
decisions will be easier when they have been supported by all Members.").
40. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, available at http://www.tufts.edu/
departments/fletcher/multi/www/league-covenant.html (last visited Mar. 10,
2003). The Covenant is also reprinted in ALFRED ZIMMERN, THE LEAGUE OF
NATIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW 1918-1935, at 511 (1945).
39. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 3, para. 4 ("At meetings of the
Assembly, each Member of the League shall have one vote...."). Id. art. 4,
para. 6 ("At meetings of the Council, each Member of the League represented on
the Council shall have one vote .... ").
40. Id. art. 5, para. 1 ("Except where otherwise expressly provided in this
Covenant or by the terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the
Assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of
the League represented at the meeting."). The Covenant did, however, expressly
provide for nine exceptions to the general rule of unanimity. See CROMWELL A.
RICHES, THE UNANIMITY RULE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 37-38 (1971).
41. See Zamora, supra note 3, at 572-73.
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As it was discovered early on, however, the requirement
of unanimity has several serious disadvantages.42 The
primary objection to this decision-making technique is that,
in practice, it leads to the rule of liberum veto,43 which
empowers each individual member to block a collective
decision.44 A number of unfortunate consequences neces-
sarily follow from this rule. First, the power of a single
participant to hold hostage the entire institution reduces
the efficiency of international collective action.45 Second, by
giving each individual state the right of veto, the rule of
unanimity becomes the enemy of international co-
operation.4 ' Having realized that withholding its consent is
all that it has to do to kill an unpleasant decision, the
dissenting state has no strong incentives to take realistic
positions or seek compromises with the rest of the
membership. Finally, as the rule of unanimity also fails to
respect sovereign autonomy of states,47 the traditional
argument that it is "the best assurance for the maintenance
of... equality"'48 does not appear to be persuasive.
Thus, it should come as no surprise that gradually, but
surely, the international community moved away from the
rule of unanimity toward majority-based decision-making.49
42. The rule of unanimity, for example, "handicapped the League [of
Nations] throughout in seeking budgetary resources adequate for the proper
discharge of its responsibilities and doomed it to frustration at vital points in its
history, notably at the crisis of the Manchurian dispute which marked the
beginning of its decline and fall." Jenks, supra note 2, at 49.
43. "Formerly in Poland, the right of any single member of the diet to
invalidate a measure." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 7, at 1558.
44. See, e.g., CLAUDE, supra note 4, at 112 ("[Alccording to [the rule of
liberum veto,] no organizational decision could be reached if any member of the
organization dissented."). In this way, the "method of decision-making by
unanimity may hamper the process itself." 2 SCHERMERS, supra note 8, at 327.
45. See Jenks, supra note 2, at 50 ("[Tlhe principle of unanimity represents
a liberum veto which involves the paralysis of effective action."); Kennedy, supra
note 3, at 46 ("Unanimity... permits states to be held hostage by one bad
actor,.., preventing international action.... ."); Zamora, supra note 3, at 574
("The disadvantage of the rule of unanimity, of course, is that international
agreement is impossible to obtain when any single participant can block a
decision .... ).
46. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 46 ("By reducing international cooperation to
the lowest common denominator of sovereign accord, unanimity emasculates
the institution and sabotages cooperation.").
47. Id. ("Unanimity, as a matter of theory and practice, [does not] respect
sovereign autonomy .... ").
48. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
49. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. See also Jenks, supra note 2,
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B. The Rise of Majority Voting after World War II
Although certain international bodies adopted majority
rule as a voting procedure as early as the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries," the trend became dominant
only at the end of World War II."' The advantages of
international majoritarinism address the shortcomings of
the rule of unanimity that ultimately caused its demise.
First, majority-based decision-making markedly increases
the institutional efficiency of international collective
action. 2 It ensures that a pre-determined majority of
members backs the decision,53 while considerably diminish-
ing the risk that a reluctant minority would hamper the
decision-making process. Second, the possibility of being
outvoted provides a strong reason for even the most
obstinate participants to lead a constructive dialogue in
search for mutually acceptable positions.
In 1945, these persuasive arguments prevailed, and the
institutions founded after World War II adopted a wide
spectrum of majoritarian and weighted voting formulas. 4
Thus, the document that was probably most significant to
at 49 ("Unanimity as a mode of taking international decisions... [is] a
discredited principle ... [that] does not afford a workable basis for
contemporary international organisation; there can be no serious question of
returning to it in world organisations with some one hundred and twenty
members.").
50. The majority rule came into general use within the more technical,
rather than diplomatic, public unions. BOWETT, supra note 29, at 357. See also
McIntyre, supra note 9, at 485-86. Thus, the Universal Postal Union (1874) and
the International Commission for Aerial Navigation (1919) exercised certain
legislative powers by majority. BOWETT, supra note 29, at 357. "Bodies with
administrative functions[,] such as the Commission for Cape Spartel
Lighthouse (1865), the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine
(1815), the Governing Commission under the Saar Statute (1919), the
Permanent Sugar Commission (1902) and the Permanent Central Opium Board
(1925)[,] similarly adopted a majority vote." Id.
51. See, e.g., Karl Zemanek, Majority Rule and Consensus Technique in
Law-Making Diplomacy, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY 857, 859 (R. St. J.
MacDonald & Douglas M. Johnson eds., 1983) ("[Alt the end of World War II,
the decision-making procedure in international conferences and organizations
changed from unanimity to majority rule.").
52. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 3, at 46 ("[M]ajority voting allows for more
powerful and decisive institutional action .... ).
53. As noted, member-states may require a higher proportion of affirmative
votes to adopt a decision. See supra note 30.
54. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 46.
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the postwar global institutional system-the United
Nations ("UN") Charter55-practically abandoned the rule of
unanimity 6 in favor of broad use of majority vote.57 At the
same time, it retained the one nation-one vote system.58
The disappointment with the majority rule, which
marked a new period in the controversy concerning voting
procedures in international institutions, began by the mid-
1960s."9 Most of the arguments against this decision-
making technique claim that it leads to abuse by the
majority. First, by empowering a majority to hold the rest of
the membership to its decisions, it produces "a tyranny of
the majority"6 and alienates minorities, which may include
members that are essential to successful implementation of
these decisions. 61 Second, this decision-making procedure, if
abused by the majority, causes the international
organization to lose respect.
55. U.N. CHARTER, available at http://www.un.org/Overview/Charter/
contents.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2003). The Charter is also reprinted in
WILLIAM L. TUNG, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS
SYSTEM 260 (1969).
56. See, e.g., CLYDE EAGLETON, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT 192 (3d ed.
1957) ("[T]he rule of unanimity was abandoned for all organs of the United
Nations."). Unanimity also virtually disappeared from the specialized agencies.
BOWETT, supra note 29, at 359.
57. U.N. CHARTER art. 18, para. 3 ("Decisions [of the General Assembly] ...
shall [generally] be made by a majority of the members present and voting.").
Id. art. 27, para. 3 ("Decisions of the Security Council ... shall be made by an
affirmative vote of nine members .... "). See also 2 SCHERMERS, supra note 8, at
327 ("With only a partial exception for the Security Council... all UN decisions
are taken by majority vote.").
58. U.N. CHARTER art. 18, para. 1 ("Each member of the General Assembly
shall have one vote."). Id. art. 27, para. 1 ("Each member of the Security Council
shall have one vote.").
59. See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 46.
60. See KIRGIS, supra note 7, at 154 (noting that "the tyranny of the
majority" results when "the vital interests of the minority ... are given little
consideration before a decision by majority vote is taken").
61. Thus, for example, the first United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development ("UNCTAD") in Geneva, acting by majority under a "one nation-
one vote" system, "produced an imposing set of 'principles,' adopted by
overwhelming vote of the developing countries, which for their execution
required the active assistance of the developed countries but which were, by
and large, unacceptable to them." BOWETT, supra note 29, at 359. See also supra
note 24.
62. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 46.
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As a result, international institutions began to take
decisions by consensus.63
C. The Rule of Consensus
The rule of consensus, which is arguably a variety of
the rule of unanimity, became the keynote in international
collective action by the mid-1970s.' Thus, launched in 1975,
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
adopted this decision-making technique. 5
The arguments for and against consensus are strikingly
similar to those advanced for and against unanimity.66 On
the one hand, it ensures attention to, and respect for, the
concerns of the minority, making it impossible for a
majority to dictate its views to the whole organization. 7
Also, consensus ensures faithful implementation since, by
definition, there is no opposition to each and every decision
taken under this procedure.68 On the other hand, this
decision-making technique fails to resolve probably the
most serious weakness of the rule of unanimity-the fact
that a single member can sabotage the progress of the
entire institution.
By 1980, consensus, as a rule of decision-making in
international organizations, began to fall out of favor. As
of the time of this writing, the existing international
63. See, e.g., Jenks, supra note 2, at 55 ("In the search for a new compromise
between ease and responsibility of action[,] the concept of consensus as the most
appropriate basis for important decisions has attracted an increasing measure
of attention.").
64. See, e.g., BowETT, supra note 29, at 360 ("[Tlhe present trend [is]
towards a search for 'consensus' as opposed to a simple reliance on the results of
formal voting."); Kennedy, supra note 3, at 46 ("By 1975, the fashionable
international institution made up its mind by consensus.").
65. Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations para. 69 (1973)
("Decisions of the Conference shall be taken by consensus."), available at
http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/mcs/helfr73e.pdf (last visited Mar.
10, 2003). See generally JAN SizOo & RUDOLF TH. JURRJENS, CSCE DECISION-
MAKING: THE MADRID EXPERIENCE 57-60 (1984).
66. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 47.
67. See id. at 46.
68. See 2 SCHERMERS, supra note 8, at 328 ("Unopposed decisions have a
stronger moral force, and thus their execution is facilitated."); Zemanek, supra
note 51, at 878 ("The main argument for adopting resolutions, and especially
declarations of legal principles, by consensus is the belief that it enhances their
effectiveness.").
69. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 46.
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institutions are taking decisions by simple majority,
qualified majority, consensus, or various combinations of
these three rules.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF VOTING RULES IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION
A. Treaties Establishing the European Communities7 °
Throughout history, the idea of unification of Europe
has had a strong appeal.7 Nevertheless, the most recent
effort to put it into practice has been undertaken only after
World War II. In the 1950s, six European states73 joined
together to lay down the foundation of the contemporary
EU by establishing three Communities-the European Coal
and Steel Community ("ECSC"),74 the European Economic
70. For full citations of the treaties establishing the European Communities,
see infra notes 74, 75, 76.
71. Indeed, there is abundant evidence that the idea of European
integration has existed for ages. "The notion of a European Parliament was first
espoused by William Penn in 1693." PHILIP ARESTIS ET AL., FROM COMMON
MARKET TO EMU: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND
MONETARY INTEGRATION 1 (EconPapers, Working Paper No. 263, 1999),
available at http://econpapers.hhs.se/paper/wpawuwpma/9903013.htm (last
visited Mar. 10, 2003). "In 1795, Immanuel Kant stressed the need for ... a
Federal Europe." Id. Later, in the nineteenth century, Victor Hugo predicted a
future "United States of Europe." See, e.g., Thomas Sancton, Architects of the
Edifice: Pundit Alain Duhamel Says the Idea of a "United States of Europe" Is
Essentially French, TIME, Feb. 15, 1999, at 76. For a comprehensive history of
ideas on European integration, see generally SYLVESTER JOHN HEMLEBEN,
PLANS FOR WORLD PEACE THROUGH SIX CENTURIES (1943).
72. See, e.g., WALTER HALLSTEIN, EUROPE IN THE MAKING 18 (Charles Roetter
trans., 1972) ("It took the boundless excesses of nationalistic policy in the
Second World War, and the equally total disaster they caused, to make obvious
that in politics, and in economics also, the coutries of Europe must sink or swim
together."). See generally DEREK W. URWIN, THE COMMUNITY OF EUROPE: A
HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION SINCE 1945 (2d ed. 1995).
73. These European states were Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
74. TREATY BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, THE KINGDOM OF
BELGIUM, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC, THE GRAND DUCHY OF
LUXEMBOURG AND THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS INSTITUTING THE
EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (1957)
[hereinafter ECSC TREATY]. See generally LOUIS LISTER, EUROPE'S COAL AND
STEEL COMMUNITY: AN EXPERIMENT IN ECONOMIC UNION (1960).
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Community ("EEC"),75 and the European Atomic Energy
Community ("Euratom"). 76
The establishment of the three Communities was
preceded by heated debates among the European
governments about how much powers, if any, would have to
be taken out of national hands and given to a supra-
national authority.77 Under the so-called "federalist" or
"supranational" approach, backed primarily by the
government of France, it was proposed that authority over
the areas affected by integration be transferred to an
institution that would be above the national governments.78
By contrast, the "intergovernmental" approach, supported
by the governments of Germany and Benelux, called for the
retention of national control over the supranational body.79
The signing of the Treaty Instituting the ECSC in 1951
became the first step in European integration.' Although
75. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958) [hereinafter EEC TREATY]. See generally LEON N.
LINDBERG, THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
(1963).
76. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY
(EURATOM), Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167 (1958) [hereinafter EURATOM
TREATY]. See generally JAROSLAv G. POLACH, EURATOM: ITS BACKGROUND,
ISSUES AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS (1964).
77. See, e.g., Rainer Arnold, A Fundamental Rights Charter for the
European Union, 15 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 43, 43 (2000-2001) ("[T]he initial
phase [of the history of European integration] ... [was] characterized by the
contrast between.., state sovereignty versus the main features of the new EC
order, namely autonomy, priority and direct effect."). See generally J.H.H.
WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: "Do THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN
EMPEROR?" AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 268-85 (1999)
(surveying conflicting theoretical approaches to European integration).
78. See, e.g., STEPHEN GEORGE, POLITICS AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
3 (3d ed. 1996) (noting that one of the two most controversial features of the
integration scheme proposed by France was "an institution that was above the
governments of the member states, or supranational"). See also Kanishka
Jayasuriya, Globalization, Law, and the Transformation of Sovereignty: The
Emergence of Global Regulatory Governance, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 425,
441 (1999) (noting that the supranational approach "sees in the EU the
strengthening roots of a new federal constitutional order-an order that will
result in a layer of supranational governance").
79. See GEORGE, supra note 78, at 3-4 (noting that opposition to the French
proposal "came primarily from [Germany]" and that "[i]t was also the approach
favoured by the Benelux states"). See also Jayasuriya, supra note 78, at 442
(noting that the intergovernmental approach "insists that the national State in
Europe remains strong").
80. See Collette B. Cunningham, In Defense of Member State Culture: The
Unrealized Potential of Article 151(4) of the EC Treaty and the Consequences for
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the original plans for the ECSC made no mention of an
institution that would represent the member states,81 it was
ultimately decided to include one in the structure of the
Community. This was the Council of Ministers. In 1957,
the six governments followed the suit in the EEC and
Euratom treaties, including Council of Ministers as an
institution designed to "ensure the co-ordination of the
general economic policies of the Member States" and
"dispose of a power of decision.""
Structurally, the three Communities resembled one
another, with four principal institutions-a General
Assemblxy, 84 a Council of Ministers ("Council"), a Com-
mission, and a Court of Justice.86 The Treaties established
somewhat similar decision-making procedures for the three
Councils. Under this procedure, a Commission or the High
Authority initiated a proposal and, where so required by the
respective treaty, submitted it to the Council for approval.
The Council then, depending on the nature of the proposal,
EC Cultural Policy, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 119, 124 (2001); Nicholas A. Gunia,
Comment, Towards a Supranational Identity? The Implications of a Single
European Currency, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 97, 102 n.25 (1999). See also FRANCOIS
DUCHNE, JEAN MONNET: THE FIRST STATESMAN OF INTERDEPENDENCE 239
(1994); Barbara Crutchfield George et al., The Dilemma of the European Union:
The Power of the Supranational EU Entity against the Sovereignty of Its
Independent Member Nations, 9 PACE INT'L L. REV. 111, 112-13 (1997).
81. See ARESTIS ET AL., supra note 71, at 7.
82. See ERNST B. HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE: POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND
ECONOMIC FORCES, 1950-1957 55 (2d ed. 1968).
83. EEC TREATY art. 145. See EURATOM TREATY art. 115. Yet, it should be
noted that, in key aspects, the institutional structure of the EEC Treaty differs
from the ECSC Treaty. ARESTIS ET AL., supra note 72, at 10. The High
Authority, the independent supranational organ of the ECSC, had greater
powers vis-A-vis the ECSC Council, compared to the relative authorities of the
counterpart institutions of the other two Communities. Thus, in a number of
substantive areas, such as, for example, price fixing or fining firms for
violations of competition rules, it could act independently of the member
governments. See id at 7. In contrast, the Commission of the EEC had no
independent area of action marked out for it. GEORGE, supra note 79, at 6.
84. Since 1962, the Assembly has generally been known as the "European
Parliament" [hereinafter EP]. See, e.g., NEILL NUGENT, THE GOVERNMENT AND
POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 129 (2d ed. 1991).
85. As noted above, in the ECSC, it was the High Authority. See supra note
83.
86. ECSC TREATY art. 7; ECC TREATY art. 4, para. 1; EURATOM TREATY art.
3, para. 1. In 1967, as a result of the 1965 Merger Treaty, the institutions of the
Communities were merged. Therefore, there is now one Council, one
Commission, one Court of Justice, and one Assembly for all three Communities.
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took decision by a simple majority, a qualified majority, or
unanimity."
As a general rule, the Treaties provided that the
conclusions of the Council "shall be reached by a majority
vote of its members.""8 However, when the respective Treaty
provided otherwise, the simple majority rule was trumped
in favor of such express provision. Therefore, in certain
situations, the Councils were required to act unanimously89
or by a qualified majority."
87. See, e.g., NUGENT, supra note 84, at 118. This decision-making procedure
thus established by the Treaties is generally referred to as the "consultation
procedure." See, e.g., GEORGE, supra note 78, at 28. Under it, the key decision-
makers are the Commission and the Council. The opinion of the EP could be
simply ignored. Id. The division of powers between the Commission and the
Council under the "consultation procedure" reflected a compromise between the
opposing views of the member governments as to the supranational powers of
the EC. Nevertheless, it was argued that the "intergovernmental" approach to
the European integration ultimately prevailed. Be it as it may, the tension
concerning the decision-making procedures of the EC has remained, leading to
a number of significant reforms in the future.
88. ECC TREATY art. 148, para. 1; EURATOM TREATY art. 118, para. 1. The
ECSC Treaty uses the term "absolute majority" and provides that such majority
"shall be deemed to have been granted if the proposal submitted by the High
Authority is approved.., by an absolute majority of the representatives of the
member States, including the vote of the representative of one of the states which
produces as least twenty percent of the total value of coal and steel produced in
the Community ..... " ECSC TREATY art. 28 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the
ECSC Treaty provides that, in cases of an equal division of votes, and if the
High Authority maintains its proposal after a second reading, the absolute
majority may be achieved by votes "by the representatives of two member
States, each of which produces at least twenty percent of the total value of coal
and steel in the Community." Id. These provisions were clearly intended to
benefit Germany and France, the only two members of the ECSC that were
considered to produce more than twenty percent of the total value of coal and
steel in the Community. See LISTER, supra note 74, at 10.
89. As defined in the ECSC Treaty, "a unanimous decision or unanimous
concurrence" exists "if supported by the votes of all of the members of the
Council." ECSC TREATY art. 28. Under the ECC and Euratom Treaties,
"[abstentions... shall not prevent the adoption of Council conclusions
requiring unanimity." ECC TREATY art. 148, para. 3; EURATOM TREATY art. 118,
para. 3.
90. Under the ECC and Euratom Treaties, where conclusions of the Council
required a qualified majority, the votes of the members were to be weighted.
ECC TREATY art. 148, para. 2; EURATOM TREATY art. 118, para. 2. The vote
distribution was as follows: Belgium - 2, Germany - 4, France - 4, Italy - 4,
Luxembourg - 1, Netherlands - 2. ECC Treaty art. 148, para. 2; Euratom Treaty
art. 118, para. 2.
Under the ECC and Euratom Treaties, the rules of qualified majority voting
differ slightly in two distinct situations. Thus, if the Council of Ministers acts
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B. The Luxembourg Accords
As noted, when the six governments signed the Treaties
establishing the EC in 1951 and 1957, France supported the
"supranational" approach.9' After the collapse of the Fourth
Republic, however, a new government came to power, which
was categorically opposed to any increase in powers of the
Commission." As a result of this opposition, in 1965, the EC
faced the most dramatic crisis in history, which had a
significant effect upon the voting procedure of the Council
for the decades to come.
Under the EEC Treaty, the six governments agreed
upon a "transitional period" of twelve years for the
progressive establishment of the common market.93 In 1962,
an acceleration agreement reduced the length of the
transition.94 In the course of the "transitional period," most
decisions were subject to unanimity.95 In contrast, after the
end of the transition, most decisions would be taken by a
qualified majority voting. 6
Thus, during the early years of the EC, most decisions
of the Council had been taken unanimously. The solution of
particularly difficult problems has been achieved as a result
on a previous proposal of the Commission, twelve votes are required. ECC
TREATY art. 148, para. 2; EURATOM TREATY art. 118, para. 2. In other cases, a
qualified majority is achieved by "twelve votes including a favourable vote by at
least four members ... ." ECC TREATY art. 148, para. 2; EURATOM TREATY art.
118, para. 2. This provision was apparently included to protect smaller member
states so that, where the Treaties did not require a previous proposal of the
Commission, Germany, France, and Italy, acting alone, could not achieve a
qualified majority unless a fourth member state joined them, voting in favor of
the decision.
91. See supra text accompanying note 78.
92. See, e.g., GEORGE, supra note 78, at 9 (noting that "De Gaulle remained
implacably opposed to any increase in the powers of the European Commission,
or to any other increase in supranationalism").
93. EEC TREATY art. 8, para. 1. See also Roland Bieber & Cesla Amarelle,
Simplification of European Law, 5 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 15, 24 (1998-1999);
Anthony J. Davis, Canada's Constitutional Crisis after Meech Lake: Setting a
New Course for a European Union?, 18 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 224, 254
(1992); Christoph Henkel, Constitutionalism in the European Union: Judicial
Legislation and Political Decision-Making by the European Court of Justice, 19
WIS. INT'L L.J. 153, 158-59 (2001).
94. See Council Decision 62/528, 1962 O.J. (41) 1284.




of the famous "marathon sessions" of the Council.97 The first
serious institutional crisis in the EC occurred in 1963, when
France unilaterally vetoed British membership.98 Two years
later, a much more serious crisis occurred, postponing
transition of the Council to decision making by qualified
majority for about twenty years."
In 1965, the Commission, in an attempt to solve a
number of outstanding problems, put forward a package
deal that sought to extend the powers of the EC.' ° The
French government objected to the supranational impli-
cations of this package deal, and used this occasion to
express its opposition to the expansion of the number of
issues subject to qualified majority voting in the Council.'
Because no compromise could be found, France resorted to
the "policy of empty chair," pulling its representatives out of
all meetings of the Council and thus blocking its work."2
In early 1966, some six months after the French
protest, the 1965 crisis was resolved through the
Luxembourg Accords. 13 Under this agreement, in every
case where a decision that may be taken by majority vote on
a proposal of the Commission involves "very important
interests" of one or more of the member-states, the Council
"will attempt, within a reasonable period of time, to arrive
97. D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 235 (5th ed. 1991). "The longest of these, concerning the making
of regulations to implement the agricultural policy, took place from December
1961 through January 1962 and lasted almost three weeks." Id.
98. See Introduction to EUR. ECON. CMTY. COMM'N, SIXTH GENERAL REPORT
ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITY 11 (1963). See also LASOK & BRIDGE,
supra note 97, at 236.
99. See infra Part II.C.
100. See, e.g., JOHN PETERSON & ELIZABETH BOMBERG, DECISION-MAKING IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION 49 ex.2.5 (1999). The most important aspects of this
package deal were the Completion of the Common Agricultural Policy, changing
the basis of Community income from national contributions to own resources,
and the granting of greater powers of control to the European Parliament over
the use of those resources. NUGENT, supra note 84, at 119.
101. See, e.g., LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 97, at 237; PETERSON &
BOMBERG, supra note 100, at 49 ex.2.5; J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of
Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2423 (1991).
102. See, e.g., LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 97, at 237.
103. Arrangements Made in Luxembourg between the Foreign Affairs
Ministers of the Six, Jan. 31, 1966, 5 I.L.M. 316 (1966) [hereinafter
Luxembourg Accords]. The Luxembourg Accords is also reprinted in EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY TREATIES 234 (1972).
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at solutions that could be adopted" unanimously.14
However, the six delegations made no decision as to what is
to be done "in the event that conciliation cannot be fully
attained."'°
As noted, the Luxembourg Accords has had a profound
impact upon decision-making in the Council at all levels.
Although the legal validity of this agreement is highly
suspect,"°6 the members of the Council have interpreted it to
mean that no decision could be taken until a unanimous
agreement was reached.0 7 "As a consequence, a 'veto cul-
ture' emerged and most important decisions of the Council
were generally taken by consensus even in cases where
qualified majority voting was required.' 0 8
C. The Single European Act and Beyond
Although it is true that, even after the Luxembourg
Accords, qualified majority voting has never been
completely excluded from the decision-making procedures of
the Council,0 9 within years after 1966, it became clear that
the rule of unanimity led to slowing down and sometimes
complete blocking of the process of integration."0 In 1974, it
was declared that "it is necessary to renounce the practice
which consists of making agreements on all questions
conditional on the unanimous consent of the Member
States . . . .""' Thus, it is not surprising that, by the late
104. Id. para. 1, at 317. In a separate paragraph, the French delegation
expressed its position that, "when very important interests are concerned,
discussion must be continued until unanimous agreement has been reached."
Id. para. 2 (emphasis added).
105. Id. para. 3. Despite the divergence of views, the six delegations agreed
that decisions by "common agreement" were appropriate is a number of specific
areas. See id. para. 5.
106. LAsOK & BRIDGE, supra note 97, at 238. See also Weiler, supra note
101, at 2423. Thus, the Luxembourg Accords cannot be considered either an
amendment to, or an interpretation of, the EEC Treaty because the relevant
procedures of the Treaty were not followed. LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 97, at
238-39. Moreover, the agreement has never been duly ratified by the member
states. Id. at 239.
107. PETERSON & BOMBERG, supra note 100, at 49 ex.2.5.
108. Id.
109. NUGENT, supra note 84, at 122.
110. See LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 97, at 240.
111. COMM'N [EuR. COMMUNITIES], EIGHTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN 1974, at 298 (1975). This
declaration has been followed by several proposals to the same effect. Thus, the
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1970s and early 1980s, the Council, despite the
Luxembourg Accords, had increasingly resorted to qualified
majority voting, 112 and the member-states had become more
willing to abstain'13 rather than to insist on exercising the
power of veto.
114
This practice was ultimately formalized when the
Single European Act ("SEA")"5 was adopted in 1986,
following a 1985 White Paper prepared by the
Commission."6 The White Paper focused on the question of
the internal market, drawing particular attention to the
outstanding objectives and proposing the way to achieve
them by the end of 1992.17 In order to facilitate the
completion of the internal market by this deadline, the SEA
amended the Treaties establishing the EC, making
qualified majority voting the most common formal decision
rule of the Council."8 Moreover, in 1987, the Council
amended its own rules of procedure to make it far easier for
a vote by qualified majority voting to be called."9 Is also
noteworthy that, in addition to extending qualified majority
voting in the Council, the SEA also introduced the "co-
so-called Tindemans Report advocated recourse to majority voting in the
Council as a "normal practice of the Community." LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note
97, at 24. See generally J.D.B. Mitchell, The Tindemans Report-Retrospect and
Prospect, 13 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 455 (1976). The Report of an ad hoc
committee that was set up by the European Council in 1984 to look into
institutional affairs also proposed, inter alia, that decisions of the Council of
Ministers should normally be taken by qualified or simple majority. LASOK &
BRIDGE, supra note 97, at 25.
112. See generally COMM'N [EUR. COMMUNITIES], ELEVENTH GENERAL REPORT
ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN 1977 (1978).
113. As noted, under the ECC and Euratom Treaties, abstentions did not
prevent the Council from adopting decisions requiring unanimity. See supra
note 90.
114. See, e.g., EMILE NOEL, WORKING TOGETHER: THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 27 (1988).
115. SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT, Feb. 28, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1.
116. See, e.g., P.S.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
12-13 (5th ed. 1990).
117. See LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 97, at 23;
118. See, e.g., PETERSON & BOMBERG, supra note 100, at 48.
119. See Council Decision 87/508, 1987 O.J. (L 291) 27. Thus, prior to the
amendment, only the President of the Council could call the vote. Under the
new rule, "[t]he Council shall [still] vote on the initiative of its President." Id.
art. 5, para. 1. However, "[tihe President shall.., be required to open voting
proceedings on the invitation of a member of the Council or of the Commission,




operation" procedure, significantly enhancing the influence
of the EP over the EC decision-making process.'2 0
The SEA had important implications for the decision-
making procedure of the EU. It changed the nature of
consensus building in the Council from insistence on
unanimity to persuading reluctant members to change their
positions or abandon their opposition.'2' The possibility of
taking most decisions by a qualified majority "generally
transformed the climate of decision-making." ''
Although the SEA made qualified majority voting the
applicable rule in a significant number of decision-making
areas of the Council, unanimity was still required in
others.'23 Several of the following treaties have further
modified the decision-making procedures of the EC. Thus,
the 1992 Treaty on European Union ("TEU")114 was notable
in that respect for two reasons. First, it removed several
important substantive areas from the requirement of
unanimous consent of the Council.'25 Second, the TEU
introduced the "co-decision procedure," further increasing
the ability of the EP to influence EC legislation in a broad
range of substantive areas.'26 The 1996 Amsterdam Treaty'27
120. See, e.g., GEORGE, supra note 78, at 28-29. Under the "co-operation
procedure," the EP was given a right of second reading over legislation that was
to be covered by qualified majority voting in the future. Thus, if the EP
approves the proposed legislation, or does not act at all within three months,
the Council may adopt it. Id. at 28. However, if the EP, acting by an absolute
majority of all its members, rejects the legislation, the Council may override
such rejection only by unanimity. Id.
121. See generally Helen Wallace, The Institutions of the EU: Experience and
Experimentation, in POLICY-MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 54, (Helen Wallace
& William Wallace eds., 3d ed. 1996).
122. J.H.H. Weiler, The Reformation of European Constitutionalism, 35 J.
COMMON MKT. STUD. 97, 107 (1997).
123. See, e.g., COMM'N EUR. COMMUNITIES, XXIIND GENERAL REPORT ON THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1988, at 32 (1989); COMM'N EUR.
COMMUNITIES, XXIIIRD GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 1989, at 30-31 (1990).
124. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992).
125. See; e.g., Michael H. Abbey & Nicholas Bromfield, A Practitioner's
Guide to the Maastricht Treaty, 15 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 1329, 1331-32 (1994).
126. See, e.g., GEORGE, supra note 78, at 29. The "co-decision procedure"
gives the EP even stronger powers than the "co-operation procedure." Id. Thus,
if the EP rejects the legislation, a Conciliation Committee is set up consisting of
equal number of representatives of the Council and the EP. If the Committee
agrees a joint text, the EP, acting by an absolute majority, and the Council,
acting by a qualified majority, have six weeks to adopt it. If either of the two
fails to adopt the legislation, it is effectively dead. Id.
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followed the trend, providing for a limited extension of the
use of qualified majority voting. 18
In early 2001 the member states of the EU signed the
Treaty of Nice.19 This Treaty once again revised the
decision-making system of the EU. First, it was agreed that
the definition of qualified majority would be changed by
2005.3 Thus, as of January 1, 2005, a qualified majority
will be obtained if "the decision receives at least a specified
number of votes" and "is approved by a majority of Member
States."'' Second, there was a re-distribution of the number
of weighted votes allocated to each member state. Finally,
the Treaty of Nice to some extent widened the scope of
decision-making by qualified majority.'
III. THE EVOLUTION OF VOTING RULES IN THE GATT/WTO
Like the EU, the GATT/WTO system has been evolving
over the years. First was the idea of an International Trade
Organization, which failed to materialize when the United
States Congress refused to approve the Havana Charter.'33
Then, GATT 1947-an agreement that lacked sophisticated
procedural provisions-became the single instrument to
govern most of global commerce for approximately four
decades.' And, lastly, almost half a century later, the
dream of creating a comprehensive international trade
127. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE
TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED
ACTS, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997).
128. See, e.g., MICHAEL NENTWICH & GERDA FALKNER, THE TREATY OF
AMSTERDAM: TOWARDS A NEW INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE 9 (Eur. Integration
Online Papers, Paper No. 15, 1997), at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-015a.
htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
129. TREATY OF NICE AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE
TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED
ACTS, Feb. 26, 2001, O.J. (C 80) 1 (2001).
130. David O'Sullivan, Memorandum to the Members of the Commission:
Summary of the Treaty of Nice, SEC(2001) 99 Part I.C (2001), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/nice-treaty/summary-en.pdf (last visited Mar. 10,
2003).
131. Id.
132. The list of the twenty-seven provisions to which the qualified majority
rule will apply as from the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice is available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/nice-treaty/procedures-en.pdf (last visited Mar. 10,
2003).
133. See infra Part III.A.
134. See infra Part III.B.
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institution has finally come true with the signing of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. 13 5
As the form of international arrangements put in place
to govern trade among nations has been evolving, so have
been the rules for making decisions pertaining to
international trade. This Part offers a brief account of these
developments.
A. The Havana Charter and the International Trade
Organization
While World War II was still being fought on the
battlefields, the allied powers began to think about how
they could make the world a safer place in the future.'36 It
was at that time that the institutional framework of the
postwar international order, which has largely remained in
place to this day, was being engineered.'37 At the heart of it,
there was to be a global intergovernmental organization
charged with ensuring world peace and security-the
United Nations. 38 The responsibility for future inter-
135. See infra Part III.C.
136. See HERBERT VERE EvATT, THE UNITED NATIONS 7 (1948) ("It is clear
that President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill realized at an early stage the
importance of giving the peoples of the world some real hope of avoiding war in
the future, after securing victory in World War IH."); KATHARINE SAVAGE, THE
STORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 18 (1962) ("While the heavy responsibilities of
war still rested on their shoulders the two great leaders, Winston Churchill and
Franklin Roosevelt, had turned their minds to the problems of peace.");
Anthony Clark Arend, The United Nations, Regional Organizations, and
Military Operations: The Past and the Present, 7 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 3, 5
(1996) ("While World War II raged in Europe and Asia, the Allies began
planning the shape of the post-war order.").
137. See Rorden Wilkinson, The WTO in Crisis: Exploring the Dimensions of
Institutional Inertia, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 397, 400 (2001) ("[Elarly on into the
war the allied powers, and in particular the United Kingdom and the United
States, decided that an intrinsic part of post-war reconstruction was to be the
development of a world institutional framework designed to guard against the
outbreak of war."). See also Finlayson & Zacher, supra note 19, at 561 ("During
the latter stages of World War Two the United States and the United Kingdom
began extensive bilateral discussions concerning the shape of the postwar
international economic order.").
138. As noted, the allied powers began efforts to create such an organization
while World War II was still being fought on the battlefields. See PATRICK J.
RooKE, THE UNITED NATIONS 1 (Ivor D. Astley ed., 1966) ("It was during the
Second World War itself that the first steps were taken to create an
organization whose aim would be to try to prevent war, and to help settle
disputes peaceably."). On the formation of the United Nations, see generally
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national economic and financial relations, in turn, was to be
assumed by three organizations-the International
Monetary Fund ("IMF"), the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development ("World Bank"), and the
International Trade Organization ("ITO")." 9 The ITO, as it
is clear from its name, was to be entrusted with the
reconstruction of world trade."'
Unfortunately, while the UN, the IMF, and the World
Bank all came into existence promptly at the end of World
War II, to the idea of the ITO, history was not as kind.141
Initiatives to im lement the idea, undertaken largely by the
United States,R commenced in late 1945,'4 ultimately
leading to a 1948 conference in Havana, where the aspiring
members of the ITO completed its draft charter ("Havana
Charter").'4 Constitutionally, however, before the United
ROBERT E. RIGGS & JACK C. PLANO, THE UNITED NATIONS: INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS 14-19 (1988); RUTH B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY
OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 1940-1945
(1958).
139. See Wilkinson, supra note 137, at 401. See also CLAUDE E. BARFIELD,
FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY: THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION 20 (2001) ("At a historic 1944 conference at Bretton Woods, New
Hampshire, the finance ministers of the wartime allied nations agreed to
establish charters for the International Monetary Fund [IMF] to facilitate
financial transactions and the World Bank to provide assistance to war-torn
nations and developing countries.").
140. See OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT
MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 1 (1987) ("Alongside the International Monetary
Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [GATT
1947] was [meant] to bring about the re-establishment and expansion of world
trade.").
141. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 293 ("The original idea was to
create a broader international organization to be named the 'International
Trade Organization' (ITO), but history was not kind to that idea.").
142. Id. ("The initiatives towards the development of a GATT and an ITO
began during World War II and came principally from the United States.").
Jackson has explained these initiatives as being the result of two strands of
American economic policy. First, the United States became convinced that a
multilateral approach to tariff reduction negotiations was more effective than a
bilateral approach. Id. Second, American policy-makers also "recognized the
role of international economic affairs in causing World War II and sought to
prevent a recurrence of such an event." Id.
143. For a brief discussion of the initiatives of the United States and other
international events leading to the Havana conference, see id. at 294-95; see
also Dukgeun Ahn, Linkages between International Financial and Trade
Institutions: IMF, World Bank and WTO, 34 J. WORLD TRADE 1, 3-4 (2000).
144. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 295. See also Finlayson & Zacher,
supra note 19, at 561 ("[Iln March 1948, over fifty countries signed the Havana
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States could adopt the Havana Charter, congressional
"Advice and Consent" had to be given. 145 The Charter was
submitted to Congress several times but, ironically enough,
was consistently rejected. 146 Finally, in late 1950, the United
States decided to cease resubmitting it for congressional
approval, effectively putting the ITO to death.
147
Although the ITO died before it could be born, the draft
document that was produced in the course of the
negotiations-the Havana Charter 18-provides some
interesting insights into how its aspiring members wanted
it to work. Most notably, the Charter contained a set of
detailed provisions regarding the structure and functions of
the to-be-established ITO. Under it, there were to be three
main bodies-a Conference, an Executive Board, and
Commissions 49 established by the Conference "as may be
Charter for the International Trade Organization (ITO).").
145. The United States Constitution provides that the President "shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,
provided that two thirds of the Senators present concur .... " U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). See also JACKSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 294
(Because "the President had no authority to accept international organization
membership for the United States without congressional [Advice and
Consent,] .... [iut was understood that an ITO charter would be submitted to
Congress (or to the Senate) for approval.").
146. See, e.g., Finlayson & Zacher, supra note 19, at 561 ("The U.S.
Congress failed to approve American participation in the ITO. . . ."). The irony
of the situation, of course, was the fact that it had been the United States that
initiated and supported the idea of an ITO throughout the negotiations. Thus,
as noted by Finlayson and Zacher, "the most fervent proponent of a
comprehensive code of international law to govern trade policies was itself
largely responsible for the demise of the ambitious ITO scheme." Id. at 561-62.
Jackson has explained this seeming inconsistency, observing that, "by the late
1940s the enthusiasm of international cooperation that prevailed immediately
after World War II had faded, and the composition of Congress had shifted to a
stance less liberal on trade matters and less internationally oriented." JACKSON
ETAL., supra note 24, at 295.
147. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 295 ("Recognizing the inevitable,
in December 1950, the Executive Branch announced that it would not re-submit
the ITO charter to Congress for approval, and for all practical purposes the ITO
charter was dead."); Ahn, supra note 143, at 4 ("Due to several reasons,
including protectionist revival in domestic politics and dwindled support from
the business community, however, the Truman administration abandoned its
efforts to secure congressional approval of the Havana Charter by withdrawing
it from the legislative calendar in December 1950.").
148. United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana
Charter for an International Trade Organization, Mar. 24, 1948, U.N. Doc.
E/Conf.2/78 [hereinafter Havana Charter].
149. Id. art. 73.
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required for the performance of the functions of the
Organization.' 150
The "powers and duties" of the principal decision-maker
of the ITO-the Conference"'-were to include, among
other things, assigning powers and duties to the Executive
Board,5 ' granting waivers,'53 and preparing or sponsoring,
and recommending for acceptance agreements on any issue
covered by the Havana Charter." The Conference was to
work as a committee of the whole,'55 under a one nation-one
vote system. 156 Most importantly, the Charter provided that,
absent an express exception, "decisions of the Conference
shall be taken by a majority of the Members present And
voting... ."' Thus, the basic decision-making rule in the
Conference was to be a simple majority.
Like the Conference, the Executive Board, which was to
be responsible for executing the policies of the ITO,
performing the duties assigned to it by the Conference, and
supervising the activities of, and acting on the
recommendations by, the Commissions, 8 was to take its
decisions by a simple majority, 9 under a one nation-one
150. Id. art. 82.
151. Id. art. 77, para. 1 ("The powers and duties attributed to the
Organization by this Charter and the final authority to determine the policies of
the Organization shall be vested in the Conference.").
152. Id. para. 2 ("The Conference may, by a vote of a majority of the
Members, assign to the Executive Board any power or duty of the Organization
except such specific powers and duties as are expressly conferred or imposed
upon the Conference by this Charter.").
153. Id. para. 3 ("In exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for in
this Charter, the Conference may waive an obligation imposed upon a Member
by the Charter .... ).
154. Id. para. 4 ("The Conference may prepare or sponsor agreements with
respect to any matter within the scope of this Charter and, by a two-thirds
majority of the Members present and voting, recommend such agreements for
acceptance.").
155. Id. art. 74, para. 1 ("The Conference shall consist of all the Members of
the Organization.").
156. Id. art. 75, para. 1 ("Each Member shall have one vote in the
Conference.").
157. Id. para. 2. In cases where a majority decision was taken by less than
half of the total membership, the Charter provided that the rules of procedure
of the Conference could allow any Member to request a second vote. Id. The
decision reached on the second vote, however, was to be final regardless of
whether or not more than half of the total membership voted. Id.
158. Id. art. 81, para. 1.
159. Id. art. 79, para. 2 ("Decisions of the Executive Board shall be made by
a majority of the votes cast.").
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vote system.' 6° In a striking contrast to the procedures of
the Conference, however, the Executive Board was not
designed to operate as a committee of the whole. Instead, to
ensure effective management,161 its membership was to be
limited to eighteen members of the ITO, to be selected by
the Conference. 62
Thus, it appears that, had the ITO come into existence,
the Havana Charter, with its majority-based voting rules
and an executive body with limited membership, would
have provided for significant decision-making flexibility in
its key organs. Unfortunately, it never had.'63
B. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947
1. The Decision-Making Rules under GATT 1947. At the
same time when the negotiations of the Havana Charter
were in progress, another document-the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-was being negotiated as
well.' The General Agreement was "designed to record the
results of a tariff conference that was envisioned at the time
as being the first of a number of such conferences to be
conducted under the auspices of the ITO.'
65
160. Id. para. 1 ("Each Member of the Executive Board shall have one
vote.").
161. SYLVIA OSTRY, WHAT ARE THE NECESSARY INGREDIENTS FOR THE WORLD
TRADING ORDER? 10 (2002), available at http://www.library.utoronto.ca/
envireformlconference/nov2002/ostry-paper2.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
162. Havana Charter art. 78, para. 1. See also LONG, supra note 140, at 51
("[TIhe ITO, which would have come into being if the Havana Charter had been
ratified, would have had an Executive Council of eighteen members."). The
Charter further specified that the membership of the Executive Board "shall be
representative of the broad geographical areas to which the Members of the
Organization belong." Havana Charter art. 78, para. 2(a).
163. See supra text accompanying footnotes 141-47.
164. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 294 ("The General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was drafted at the Geneva conference,
simultaneously with the tariff negotiations and the work on the ITO charter.").
165. KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT-LAw AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 11 (1970). See also JACKSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 294 ("The
basic idea for the General Agreement was that it would be an agreement to
embody the results of the tariff negotiations, but that it would also include some
of the general protective clauses which would prevent evasion of the tariff
commitments.").
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When it was being created, GATT 1947 was not
planned as a permanent and independent arrangement.
166
To the contrary, it was only drafted and applied as an
interim measure-until the anticipated establishment of
the ITO. 67 When it became obvious that the ITO was not to
be, however, the General Agreement remained and has, in
effect, turned into the principal rule system to govern most
of world trade for several decades to come.'68 Unfortunately,
the circumstances of its birth led to a number of procedural
weaknesses or, as some commentators put it, "birth
defects."'69 Most significantly, GATT 1947 had under-
166. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 1
(1990); Finlayson & Zacher, supra note 19, at 562 (GATT 1947 was to be
"incorporated into the commercial policy chapter of the ITO Charter."). See also
DEBRA GLASSMAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE WTO (Issues in Global Educ., Issue
No. 160, 2000) ("[Flor almost half a century-and entirely by accident-the
GATT remained the only international trade agreement."), available at http:l!
www.globaled.org/issues/160/b.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
167. See BARFIELD, supra note 139, at 21 (GATT was "an interim
arrangement negotiated in 1947 as a means to jump-starting the process of
tariff reduction, pending the establishment of the ITO."); LONG, supra note 140,
at 44 ("[TIhe GATT, from its beginnings has remained a provisional multilateral
trade agreement."); Wilkinson, supra note 137, at 401 ("The GATT was
intended to be a provisional agreement among 23 'Contracting Parties' designed
to kick-start the process of liberalization .... "). See also Finlayson & Zacher,
supra note 19, at 562 (The rules of GATT 1947 were necessary "to ensure that
the tariff concessions would have legal status and not be undermined by other
trade measures before the comprehensive ITO entered into force."). See
generally JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 49-53 (1969).
The General Agreement became effective through a Protocol of Provisional
Application, signed by twenty-two governments in 1947. Protocol of Provisional
Application to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 308. Originally, it was expected that "after the
[Havana Charter] came into force, the Protocol of Provisional Application would
fall by the wayside, and the General Agreement would be applied definitively."
JACKSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 295.
168. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 295 ("The death of the ITO meant
that GATT was, by default, the central organization for conducting national
policies on international trade."); JACKSON, supra note 166, at 1; Finlayson &
Zacher, supra note 19, at 562 ("When the ITO failed to materialize, the GATT
was transformed from a temporary agreement into a normative-institutional
framework in which governments pursued multilateral regulation and
discussed trade policy."). See also ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN
THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 3 (1987) (GATT 1947 "created a legal framework for a
mutual reduction in tariffs negotiated between the signatory governments.").
169. BARFIELD, supra note 141, at 21 ("The 'birth defects' of the GATT left
strange anomalies in organization and procedures."); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE 15 (1998); Ahn,
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developed decision-making procedures-voting rules in
particular.17
Following the general trend in the international
organizations established after World War II, the General
Agreement, as well as the Havana Charter, provided that
the Contracting Parties made decisions under a one nation-
one vote system 171 acting, unless otherwise provided, by
simple majority. 2 GATT 1947 provided "otherwise"-that
is, required more than a simple majority to take a
decision-for several types of actions. Most amendments,
for example, could not be adopted without support by two-
thirds and, as a further limitation, were binding only
between the contracting parties that voted for the
amendment.173  Similarly, decisions on waivers and
accessions required a vote of a two-thirds majority.
Thus, at least on paper, the decision-making rules
under the General Agreement appear to be comparable to
those that were negotiated and incorporated into the
Havana Charter.
2. The Decision-Making Practice under GATT 1947.
Despite the express decision-making provisions of the
General Agreement, the actual practice under GATT 1947
supra note 143, at 5 ("[F]lawed constitutional beginnings [of GATT] ... had
been termed 'birth defects' ....").
170. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 295 ("Since GATT was not viewed
as an organization, it is not surprising that the General Agreement had little in
it about decision-making."); Ahn, supra note 143, at 4 (GATT 1947 "did not
contain.., the organizational provisions to the ITO."); Mary E. Footer, The Role
of Consensus in GATT/WTO Decision-Making, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 653,
663 (1996-1997) ("[The General Agreement is short on decision-making
procedures, as exemplified by its voting procedures"). See also GLASSMAN, supra
note 166 ("Never intended to govern all international trade, the GATT had
many gaps and weaknesses"-"no institutional structure[,]" "no procedures for
deciding trade argument between countries[,]" and "no enforcement powers.");
Wilkinson, supra note 137, at 402 (GATT 1947 "lacked the elaborate provisions
of [the Havana Charter].").
171. GATT art. XXV:3 ("Each contracting party shall be entitled to have one
vote at all meetings of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.").
172. Id. art. XXV:4 ("Except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement,
decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall be taken by a majority of the
votes cast.").
173. Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-
Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT'L ORG. 339, 344
(2002). However, "[almendments to Articles I, II and XXIX require unanimous
acceptance." JACKSON, supra note 166, at 24.
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has been not to resort to voting. From its very inception, the
Contracting Parties have generally refrained from formally
invoking its simple majority rule and often used an
informal version of decision-making by consensus. 174 It
appears that no decision under GATT 1947 has been taken
by voting since 1959.175 Interestingly enough, the 1960
decision that established a standing Council under the
General Agreement seemingly reaffirmed the possibility of
majority voting in the Council. The decision stated, in part,
that no action by Council "shall be taken by an affirmative
vote of less than the absolute number of affirmative votes
by which such action could have been taken by the
CONTRACTING PARTIES under the relevant provisions of
the General Agreement .. ."' In practice, however, the
Council has shown strong preference for consensus-based
174. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. See Steinberg, supra note
173, at 344. See also LONG, supra note 140, at 54-55 (The Contracting Parties
"rarely vote .... The normal procedure in GATT is to avoid voting on
controversial matters."); WTO POLICY ISSUES FOR PARLIAMENTARIANS: A GUIDE
TO CURRENT TRADE ISSUES FOR LEGISLATORS 4 (2001) ("When the WTO members
take decisions, it has to be without dissent. Consensus reigns and voting,
although provided for, has never been invoked."), available at http:// www.wto.
org/englishlres e/booksp-e/parliamentarianse.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
The practice of consensus in GATT 1947 can be traced to the 1953 Report of the
Working Party on Arrangements for Japanese Participation,' noting that,
instead of proceeding to a formal vote in reaching decisions, the chairman
generally "takes the sense of the meeting... ." See GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND
PRACTICE 1014 (6th ed. 1994); Footer, supra note 170, at 665. Similarly, the
decision on the participation of Switzerland in the work of the Contracting
Parties in connection with Swiss provisional accession included the point that,
"in the normal course of business[,] ... the CONTRACTING PARTIES do not
usually proceed to a formal vote in reaching decisions; generally[,] the
Chairman takes the sense of the meeting ...." GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND
PRACTICE, supra, at 1014.
175. See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 21 (noting that, under GATT
1947, "there had not been a vote on a policy matter (other than waivers and
terms of accession) since 1959"); Steinberg, supra note 173, at 344. See also
Gardener Patterson & Eliza Patterson, The Road from GATT to MTO, 3 MINN.
J. GLOBAL TRADE 35, 37 (1994) ("Since 1959 the practice has been for the
chairman to 'take the sense of the meeting.' "). The last recorded vote took place
in 1959, when Brazil demanded a vote on a recommendation on Freedom of
Contract in Transport Insurance. See Steinberg, supra note 173, at 344. Thus,
"[slince its establishment in 1960, the Council has never voted. It decides by
consensus." LONG, supra note 140, at 48.
176. Decision of 4 June, 1960, Establishing the Council of Representatives,
GATT B.I.S.D. (9th Supp.) at 8 (1961). See also GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND
PRACTICE, supra note 174, at 1022; Footer, supra note 170, at 669.
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decision-making.177 In order to facilitate consensus building,
the GATT/WTO has traditionally resorted to the so-called
"Green Room" process. Under the "Green Room" process, a
limited number of countries negotiated a decision to be
subsequently conveyed to the entire membership for
adoption by consensus.
C. The World Trade Organization
1. The Decision-Making Rules under the Marrakesh
Agreement. The Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization ("Marrakesh Agreement") 7 greatly altered
the express decision-making rules-while formalizing the
actual practice-under GATT 1947.179 Not only did it
reaffirm the practice of consensus-it went further,
adopting consensus as the officially preferred decision-
making rule in the WTO. Thus, the Marrakesh Agreement
provides that the WTO "shall continue the practice of
decision-making by consensus of GATT 1947.18° The simple
majority provision of the General Agreement now becomes
a fallback rule, as the Marrakesh Agreement states that,
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided, where a decision cannot be
arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue shall be
decided by ... a majority of the votes cast," with each
member of the WTO having one vote.181
Like GATT 1947, for certain decision-making areas, the
Marrakesh Agreement expressly provides "otherwise."
Thus, a vote of three-quarters of the membership is
required to adopt an interpretation of the Marrakesh
Agreement. 82 The same three-quarters majority suffices to
decide on a waiver, but only "[i]f consensus cannot be
reached."'83 Similarly, an amendment can be made with the
177. See, e.g., LONG, supra note 140, at 55.
178. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994).
179. See, e.g., JACKSON ETAL., supra note 24, at 311.
180. WTO Agreement art. IX:1. See also BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 10,
at 21; GLASSMAN, supra note 166.
181. WTO Agreement art. IXI. See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 21.
See also Steve Charnovitz, Triangulating the World Trade Organization, 96 AM.
J. INT'L L. 28, 46 n.145 ("The WTO does have standby majority and
supermajority decisions rules in the event that a consensus cannot be reached,
but these rules remain largely untested.").
182. See WTO Agreement art. IX:2.
183. Id. art. IX:3.
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approval of two-thirds of the members where no consensus
exists on the amendment."'
2. The Decision-Making Rules under the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding. Although, under the Marrakesh
Agreement, the WTO, continuing the practice of GATT
1947, takes virtually all of its decisions by consensus, there
is one very important area in which this decision-making
practice was radically changed to a rule that makes it much
easier to take decisions. This area is dispute settlement
under the agreements reached during the Uruguay Round
of multilateral trade negotiations.'85
As noted, GATT 1947 was short on procedural
provisions.'86 In particular, it did not contain a precisely
defined single general dispute settlement procedure. 8 7 One
provision of the General Agreement that was most relevant
to dispute settlement was Article XXIII.188 Under it, "[i]f any
contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing
to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being
nullified or impaired" and "no satisfactory adjustment is
effected between the contracting parties concerned within a
reasonable time," that contracting party could refer the
matter to the Contracting Parties.g
184. Id. art. X:1.
185. See Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern, What You Should Know
about Globalization and the World Trade Organization, 10 REV. INT'L ECON.
404, 414 (2002) ("The most important change in the WTO, compared to the
GATT, may be its dispute settlement mechanism.... ").
186. See supra text accompanying notes 169-170.
187. See LONG, supra note 140, at 71-72 ("A single general dispute
settlement procedure, properly speaking and precisely defined, is not provided
for in the General Agreement."); William P. Haddock, The Uruguay Round's
Dispute Settlement Understanding: Ensuring a More Stable and Predictable
Trading Environment, CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J., Fall 1994, 25, 25 ("The
original agreement... did not provide for any specific procedures to be used in
the dispute settlement process."); John H. Jackson, GATT as an Instrument for
the Settlement of Trade Disputes, 61 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 144, 144 (1967)
("There is no single sharply defined dispute-settlement procedure in GATT that
can be readily distinguished from the remaineder of GATT activity.").
188. See BARFIELD, supra note 139, at 24 (noting that Article XXIII is "[olf
greater importance" to dispute settlement under GATT 1947); Haddock, supra
note 187, at 25 (Article XXIII of GATT 1947 provided for "the most basic and
fundamental method of dispute settlement.., between the disputing parties.").
189. GATT art. XXIII:1, XXIII:2.
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The CONTRACTING PARTIES [then] shall promptly investigate
any matter so referred to them and shall make appropriate
recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to
be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate .... If
the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that the circumstances
are serious enough to justify such action, they may authorize a
contracting party or parties to suspend the application to any
other contracting party or parties of such concessions or other
obligations under this Agreement as they determine to be
appropriate in the circumstances.
19 0
Because of the procedural shortcomings of the General
Agreement, when the need for a dispute settlement
procedure arose, the Contracting Parties had to develop one
by way of practical experimentation.'91 In the early years of
GATT 1947, a variety of frameworks for settling disputes
were tried, including consideration of disputes at the
regular meetings of the Contracting Parties, the use of
working parties, and the use of panels.'92 Since 1952, the
latter framework-that is, the use of dispute settlement
panels, which, unlike the other two alternatives,
emphasized independence of decision makers' 93-has
become the common procedure under the General
Agreement.
1 9 4
Early results of dispute settlement under GATT 1947
were rather impressive."' Thus, during the 1950s, panels
190. Id. art. XXIII:2.
191. See BARFIELD, supra note 139, at 24 ("The original adjudication process
evolved largely through custom during the 1950s .... "); LONG, supra note 140,
at 73 ("Before being codified in the [1979] Understanding, the dispute
settlement procedure had developed in the GATT through customary practice.").
192. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 339 (discussing the evolution of
GATT dispute settlement procedures).
193. See BARFIELD, supra note 139, at 24 ("In 1952,... the GATT began to
move toward a more judicial approach when it decided to handle complaints
using 'panels' composed of three to five experts from neutral countries rather
than 'working parties,' which had included diplomats who, in effect, represented
their national governments."); JACKSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 339 (The shift
to the panel mechanism early on in the history of GATT 1947 "shows a desire in
GATT to emphasize adjudication by independent decisions makers as opposed
to negotiated settlements of differences by national representatives.").
194. BARFIELD, supra note 139, at 24; LONG, supra note 140, at 77.
195. Thus, evaluating the GATT 1947 dispute settlement procedure in 1963,
Jackson, having concluded that it "achieves a very high score[,]" wrote:
I suspect that the costs of the GATT procedure for the dispute
settlement are probably as minimal as any known procedure of dispute
settlement between nations in the world today, and that the returns
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were utilized quite frequently and were generally perceived
as an effective means for settling disputes. 196 By the 1960s,
however, the process changed dramatically, as the
Contracting Parties resorted to dispute settlement less
often.'97  One important factor that underlay this
development, which also led to the move to the unwritten
practice of consensus in the Council, was the emergence of
an impressive bloc of developing contracting parties in
GATT 1947.198
Not surprisingly, by the late 1960s, an increasing
number of contracting parties started to express concerns,
stressing that the system "was not functioning properly and
that compliance with GATT rules was suffering as a
result."'99 One of the glaring weaknesses of the system, also
pointed out by a number of early commentators, was the so-
called "access problem"-a series of opportunities for
and values achieved from the GATT procedure are considerably higher
than most, if not all, of the other dispute-settlement procedures.
Jackson, supra note 187, at 153, 155. See also LONG, supra note 140, at 84 ("The
panel system has resolved many differences between GATT member countries
over the years that have threatened friction and even disorder in trade
relations.").
196. See Robert E. Hudec, A Statistical Profile of GATT Dispute Settlement
Cases: 1948-1989, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 18 (1993) (noting that "[t]he
volume of complaints was reasonably strong in the 1950s (fifty-three
complaints) .... "). According to Barfield, the success that dispute settlement
under the General Agreement had in the 1950s "could be traced to its
membership, which consisted of a group of like-minded nations and diplomats
who had put together the Bretton Woods and other postwar international
organizations." BARFIELD, supra note 139, at 24.
197. See Hudec, supra note 196, at 18 (noting that "[tihe volume of
complaints.., fell to almost nothing in the 1960s (seven complaints).... ."). See
also BARFIELD, supra note 139, at 25 ("[Tlhe GATT dispute settlement system
fell into disuse during the 1960s."); Robert E. Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement
after the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145, 181
(1980) [hereinafter Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement] ("From 1962-1972, GATT
member countries other than the United States virtually abandoned use of the
GATT adjudication machinery.").
198. See BARFIELD, supra note 139, at 24 (acknowledging that the GATT
dispute settlement "changed dramatically in the 1960s, as the influence of the
postwar generation waned and, even more important, a large number of
developing countries joined the GATT").
199. Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement, supra note 197, at 147-48. See also
BARFIELD, supra note 139, at 25 ("Change came only gradually during the
1970s, spurred by an increasing awareness... that the GATT panels were
proving inadequate to the tasks assigned to them.").
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obstruction that the practice of consensus in the Council
provided to a contracting party involved in a dispute."°°
The settlement of disputes under the General
Agreement was a multistage process that could include the
establishment of a panel, the adoption of its ruling, and, if
appropriate, the imposition of sanctions.0 '  The most
serious shortcoming of the dispute settlement procedure,
quickly identified by many contracting parties and
commentators, was the fact that "[e]very decision from
beginning to end had to be made by consensus."2 2 Thus, the
respondent contracting party was free to obstruct the entire
process at any time by simply invoking its right of veto.0 3
200. See Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement, supra note 197, at 171-73. See
also Haddock, supra note 187, at 25 ("While the consensus-based system was
effective during the first several years of the GATT, by the 1970s there was
growing dissatisfaction with GATT dispute settlement procedures.").
201. See Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An
Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 9 (1999). See also
Jackson, supra note 187, at 149 ("The procedure for dispute settlement under
Article XXIII in GATT is a simple three-part one." It includes "initiation of the
complaint," "the proceeding [itself]," and "the report by the panel, or in some
cases the working party, to the [Contracting Parties] acting jointly, and in
almost every case an approval by the [Contracting Parties] of the panel
report .... ).
202. Hudec, supra note 201, at 9. See also Haddock, supra note 187, at 25
("The panel's goal was to make findings of both fact and law that would assist
the disputing parties in reaching a solution, but these findings carried no force
until the GATT Council ratified them by consensus.").
203. See Hudec, supra note 201, at 9 (The requirement of consensus in the
Council "meant that the defendant had a virtual right to veto every step of the
process, from the appointment of a panel to the adoption of the panel's legal
ruling and the authorization of trade sanctions. (Without adoption the ruling
was not legally binding.)"). See also U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS
PROGRAM 1984-85, at 53 (1987) [hereinafter U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (1984-
85)] ("Perhaps the most significant weakness [in the current dispute settlement
procedures] is that any party to a dispute can block acceptance of a panel's
report. This power knocks the teeth out of the dispute settlement mechanism
since a disputant can indefinitely delay implementing any of a panel's
recommendations."); U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2000 TRADE POLICY AGENDA
AND 1999 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE
TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 41 (2000) [hereinafter U.S. TRADE REPRE-
SENTATIVE (2000)] ("Under the GATT,. . . the defending party could simply block
any unfavorable judgment .... "); U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1991 TRADE
POLICY AGENDA AND 1990 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 39 (1991) [hereinafter U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE (1991)] ("Under the current procedures, the defending party
may block a request for a panel, and any party may block adoption of a panel
report if it loses .... [T]he complainant's request for authorization to retaliate
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Moreover, even where expressly blocking settlement efforts
was not feasible for political reasons, there were various
avenues available to the respondent to continuously delay
progress, thus both frustrating the complainant in the case
at hand as well as undermining confidence of other
potential complaining contracting parties in the system in
general."4 Finally, in cases where a panel was nevertheless
successfully appointed and issued a ruling against the
respondent, the Contracting Parties have displayed a very
strong unwillingness to authorize the imposition of
sanctions, apparently doing so only once. °5
The procedural flaws in dispute settlement GATT 1947
and the criticism coming from many contracting parties and
commentators did not go unnoticed by the Contracting
Parties. Indeed, there have been some early attempts to
make the system more efficient. Thus, during the Tokyo
Round of multilateral trade negotiations, initiatives were
taken to make improvements to the dispute settlement
process. Unfortunately, partly due to the strong objection
of the EC, this effort was unsuccessful.0 6 The resulting
document adopted in Tokyo-the Understanding Regarding
Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Sur-
veillance 21 7-did not in any substantial way affect the
can also be blocked by the defendant."). See also Haddock, supra note 187, at 25
("Blocking a panel report was an easy tactic because the Council was made up
of the full membership of the GATT, and Council decisions were made by
consensus of all parties.").
204. See, e.g., U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1995 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND
1994 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE
AGREEMENT PROGRAM 32 (1995) ("The slow pace of dispute settlement-due to
the blocking of panel reports and other tactics-was often frustrating for [the
Contracting Parties] under traditional GATT procedures.").
205. See U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (1984-85), supra note 203, at 53 ("If
dispute is not easily resolved, the [Contracting Parties] can permit the
complainant to suspend concessions or other GATT obligations. This step has
only been taken once."); Haddock, supra note 187, at 25 ("In practice, retaliation
in the form of GATT authorized suspension of obligations only occurred once.").
The only time when the Contracting Parties authorized sanctions was the result
of a complaint brought by the Netherlands against the United States for use,
contrary to the GATT, of import restraints on imported dairy products from the
Netherlands. See Netherlands Measures of Suspension of Obligations to the
United States, Nov. 8, 1952, GATT B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) 32 (1953).
206. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 116 (2d ed. 1997).
207. Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settle-




practice of consensus in the Council,"8 thus leaving all the
associated difficulties unresolved.
After the failure in Tokyo, contracting parties and
commentators have continued to express their dissatis-
faction with the dispute settlement procedures under the
General Agreement. At the 1982 ministerial meeting,
another attempt to enhance efficiency of the system was
made, again with only modest success."' The resolution
that was adopted as a result suggested the possibility of
departing from the requirement of consensus to approve a
panel report, so that the "losing" party could no longer block
or delay the dispute settlement process,210 but subsequent
practice did not seem much improved.2 '
With the establishment of the WTO, after almost thirty
years of defeat, the critics of the rule of consensus, as
applied to dispute settlement under GATT 1947, finally got
their way. By 1986, when the Uruguay Round of
multilateral trade negotiations began, a common under-
standing that the dispute settlement process needs to be
reinforced has formed among many contracting parties,
including the United States, Canada, and most developing
countries.212 This understanding was supported by the fact
that, in the 1980s, even with the consensus requirement
still in place, the panel process functioned pretty success-
fully.21
3
208. The Understanding of 1979 "codified the central procedures of the
dispute settlement system.. . ." BARFIELD, supra note 139, at 25. Most
importantly, it "maintained adoption [of panel reports] by consensus[,"
although making them "binding, once adopted." Id.
209. JACKSON, supra note 206, at 116.
210. See Ministerial Declaration, Nov. 29, 1982, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.)
at 9, 13-16 (1983). See also ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 365 (1993)
(expressing concern with the behavior of the United States in various GATT
dispute settlement cases, including delaying and blocking the adoption of panel
reports by the Council).
211. JACKSON, supra note 206, at 116.
212. BARFIELD, supra note 139, at 28 ("Although there was no formal
alliance, the developing countries and the United States shared the goal of
strengthening the dispute settlement process."); U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
(1991), supra note 203, at 39 ("[Tlhe United States supported many elements of
Canadian proposals" for improvement of the dispute settlement procedures
under the General Agreement.").
213. See Hudec, supra note 196, at 18, 22 (noting that "[t]he volume of
complaints.., exploded in the 1980s [115 complaints]" and that, "[flor settled
or conceded cases, the percentage of cases achieving full satisfaction of the legal
464 [Vol. 51
2003] WTO DECISION-MAKING 465
At least in the beginning, however, the argument for
strengthening the dispute settlement procedures was not
without opponents. Thus, in the early stages of the
Uruguay Round, the European Community-for internal
constitutional and pure protectionist reasons-resisted the
idea of empowering the panels. 214 But, by the early 1990s
the anti-reform attitudes in the EC have begun to change.21
This, in turn, opened the way for the adoption of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes ("Dispute Settlement Under-
standing"),216 which commentators have called "the strong-
est dispute settlement mechanism in the history of
international law"2" and "the 'jewel in the crown' of the
WTO Agreements. 2
1 8
Fundamentally changing procedures under the General
Agreement, the Dispute Settlement Understanding solved
many of the problems that plagued the settlement of
disputes for decades. Most importantly, by replacing
consensus-based decision-making with the rule of reverse or
negative consensus, it excluded the possibility of blocking of
claim was actually higher in the 1980s than the average for the entire forty-two
year period" from 1948 to 1989). Based on the statistics, Hudec concluded that
"[t]he huge increase in the number of complaints filed during the 1980s
indicates that a major change in government attitudes toward dispute
settlement was taking place. The fact that governments were using dispute
settlement much more frequently testifies that they had much greater
confidence in the legal system." Id. at 21
214. BARFIELD, supra note 139, at 29 ("The European Community (EC)
remained opposed to 'judicializing' of the system."). Barfield identified two
reasons behind the European resistance to strengthening of the GATT dispute
settlement system. First, "[blecause decision-making in the EC Council of
Ministers at that time required unanimity, acceptance of legally binding GATT
panel mandates was problematic." Id. Second,. the EC governments feared that
a strengthened dispute settlement system would undermine their "highly
protectionist and subsidized Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)." Id.
215. Id. at 29-30. Barfield explained the change in attitudes as a result of
the overall satisfaction of the EC governments with the operation of dispute
settlement under the General Agreement in the 1980s, on the one hand, and
their realization that the CAP was too retrograde and costly to maintain, on the
other. Id at 30.
216. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994)
[hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding].
217. OSTRY, supra note 161, at 4.
218. OXFAM, INSTITUTIONAL REFORM OF THE WTO 12 (Oxfam Pol'y Papers,
Discussion Paper 3/00, Mar. 2000), available at http://www.field.org.uk/papers/
pdf/wto7.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
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any stage of the dispute settlement process, making the
process virtually automatic.219 Thus, under the Dispute
Settlement Understanding, "[i]f the complaining party so
requests, a panel shall be established..., unless.., the
[Council, sitting as the Dispute Settlement Body, or the
DSB,] decides by consensus not to establish a panel."2 '
Further, once the panel prepares a report and circulates it
to the Members, within sixty days, "the report shall be
adopted... unless a party to the dispute... appeal[s] or
the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report."22'
The same rule applies to the adoption of reports of the
newly created Appellate Body. Thus, the Dispute
Settlement Understanding provides that "[an Appellate
Body report shall be adopted by the DSB and
unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute
unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the
Appellate Body report within 30 days following its
circulation to the Members."222
Clearly, the switch from requiring consensus for
adoption to requiring consensus to block adoption is a very
significant change from the dispute settlement procedures
under GATT 1947.223 Statistics show that, since the
establishment of the WTO and the adoption of the Dispute
Settlement Understanding, contracting parties have
219. See BARFIELD, supra note 139, at 31 (" 'Automaticity' has been broadly
introduced throughout the dispute settlement process."); THE WTO... WHY IT
MATTERS: A GUIDE FOR OFFICIALS, LEGISLATORS, CIVIL SOCIETY AND ALL THOSE
INTERESTED IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 10 ("Once a
dispute is notified to the WTO an established timetable of 'automatic' steps is
set in motion."), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/ministe/
min0le/wtomatters-e.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2003); U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 204, at 32 ("WTO dispute settlement procedures
ensure that panel reports will be automatically adopted .... ").
220. Dispute Settlement Understanding art. 6, para. 1.
221. Id. art. 16, para. 4. See also JACKSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 343;
William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System, in TRADE,
ENVIRONMENT, AND THE MILLENNIUM 119, 127 (Gary P. Sampson & W. Bradnee
Chambers eds., 1999), available at http://www.ciaonet.orgbook/sampson/Pl19-
142.PDF (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
222. Dispute Settlement Understanding art. 17, para. 14. See Davey, supra
note 221, at 128; Haddock, supra note 187, at 28 ("The only way a report can
fail to become final is if [the Council] decides by consensus not to adopt the
Appellate Body's report.").
223. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 343; Haddock, supra note 187, at 26
("The most significant structural difference in the new dispute settlement
system is the replacement of the consensus vote in the GATT Council . . ").
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utilized the new dispute settlement system much more
frequently than before, 24 which led some commentators to
argue that the new system was efficient in reaching
equitable outcomes. 2 ' Thus, the departure from the rigid
requirement of consensus can be seen as the primary factor
making the success of the new WTO dispute settlement
system possible.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF DECISION-MAKING ALTERNATIVES FOR
THE WTO
Although it appears that the Contracting Parties to the
General Agreement made a clear choice favoring the rule of
consensus over simple majority voting back in the late
1950s,2 2 ' having consistently followed it to this day,227 it is
nevertheless highly questionable whether that choice is the
best decision-making alternative for the GATT/WTO system
as it exists today. At different times, both GATT 1947 and
the WTO have experienced great difficulties in taking
important decisions due to the inflexibility of their
procedural rules or practices. There is now a strong
argument that, given the expanding membership of, and
substantive areas covered by, the WTO, it is unrealistic to
expect that consensus among its numerous and diverse
members can be effectively built at all.22 8
224. See Hudec, supra note 201, at 15, 16 ("It is evident that the volume of
dispute settlement proceedings has increased dramatically under the WTO....
[T]he volume of cases during the first three years of the WTO disputes
procedure is almost 90 percent greater than the highest volume ever reached by
the GATT disputes procedure.. . ."). According to Hudec, this increase in
volume shows that "governments have more confidence in the new procedure
because it promises to be more effective in removing trade restrictions, and thus
governments are more inclined to use it." Id. at 17.
225. See BARFIELD, supra note 139, at 34 ("Some observers have pointed to
the rise in the number of WTO cases as evidence of growing confidence in the
ability of the system to achieve just solutions."). See also U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE (2000), supra note 203, at 41 ("The first five years have
demonstrated that when a WTO member violates its WTO obligations, there
will be consequences.").
226. See supra text accompanying notes 174, 174, 177.
227. See WTO Agreement art. IX:1 ("The WTO shall continue the practice of
decision-making by consensus followed under GATT 1947."). See also BHALA &
KENNEDY, supra note 10, at 21.
228. See MILDNER, supra note 22 ("It is questionable whether or not WTO
negotiations are still efficient due to the great number of members."). See
generally JOHN S. ODELL, PROBLEMS IN NEGOTIATING CONSENSUS IN THE WORLD
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In the early years of GATT 1947, the practice of
consensus was not causing many problems.229 A small group
of like-minded countries negotiating a limited number of
trade issues as they were, the Contracting Parties had
relatively little trouble reaching decisions by consensus."'
As GATT 1947 was evolving, however, it was becoming
more and more difficult.
Three major developments have led to doubts about
workability of the rule of consensus in the GATT/WTO.
First, since the time when the General Agreement was
signed, the number of countries participating in
multilateral trade negotiations has increased dramatically.
Thus, while there originally were only twenty-three
Contracting Parties to GATT 1947,231 as of March of 2003,
the WTO had 145 members,... expecting the number to rise
to about 170 in the near future. " The implication of this
impressive growth in membership for decision-making in
the WTO is obvious-the more members are there at the
negotiation table, the harder it is to arrive at a decision by
consensus. 234
Second, the membership of the WTO is no longer
limited to a group of like-minded countries. Thus, while
there were only eleven relatively passive developing
TRADE ORGANIZATION (Univ. S. Cal., Working Paper, 2001), available at
http://csab.wustl.edu/workingpapers/Odell.PDF (last visited Mar. 10, 2003)
229. See OSTRY, supra note 161, at 2 ("Before the Uruguay Round, the GATT
club worked very well.").
230. See id. at 10 (noting that the American view at the time was that "it
was better to adopt a consensus approach which (in the small club of 23
members) would not be difficult to achieve").
231. See, e.g., Finlayson & Zacher, supra note 19, at 562 ("[T]he General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade... consisted of the tariff concessions agreed to
by the twenty-three signatories .... ).
232. Trading into the Future: the Introduction to the WTO, Members and
Observers, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/tif e/org6_e.htm
(last visited March 10, 2003).
233. See Supachai Panitchpakdi, Balancing the Competing Interests: The
Future of the WTO, in THE ROLE OF THE WTO IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 29, 33
(2000), ("The WTO membership has increased from the original 125 to 138, and
in the foreseeable future is expected to expand to 160-170 .. . ."), available at
http://www.unu.edu/news/wto/ch02.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2003). See also
OSTRY, supra note 161, at 11 ("More flexibility for the Club of 23 than the
diverse and often conflictual Coterie of 144, soon to climb to 170!").
234. INTERNATIONAL-WTO REFORM (Columbia Int'l Affairs Online, Pol'y
Brief, May 31, 2000) ("The WTO has far more members than the GATT ....
This has made it progressively harder to reach agreements."), available at
http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/oxan/oxa00020531.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
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countries among the twenty-three original Contracting
Parties to the General Agreement,2 35 about three-fourths of
the WTO membership is now represented by active
participants from the Third World." Because the North
and the South often take different approaches to inter-
national trade agenda,237 the fast growth of representation
of developing countries in the GATT/WTO has been one of
the important factors affecting consensus building.2 38 This
has been particularly true after the Uruguay Round, when
developing countries became actively involved in
international trade 9
Finally, the substantive areas of cooperation covered by
the WTO are much more comprehensive-and potentially
much more intrusive to state sovereignty-than the
relatively narrow mandate under the General Agreement.24 °
Originally, GATT 1947 had a narrow focus on tariff
reduction negotiations. The substantive areas of
multilateral trade cooperation have since expanded con-
siderably. As new areas of cooperation are added to the
WTO agenda, its decisions affect more and more sensitive
issues for the members, making the search for consensus
even harder.
These three developments have significantly crippled
decision-making in the GATT/WTO. Thus, since the Tokyo
235. NARLIKAR, supra note 25, at 6.
236. See Peter Sutherland & John Sewell, Challenges Facing the WTO and
Policies to Address Global Governance, in THE ROLE OF THE WTO IN GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 81, 85 (2000), ("More than 100 of the WTO's 138 current members
are developing countries."), available at http://www.unu.edu/news/wto/ch05.pdf
(last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
237. See OSTRY, supra note 161, at 4 (noting that there is "a serious North-
South divide in the WTO").
238. See Sutherland & Sewell, supra note 236, at 88 ("[T]he growing
numbers of active developing counties had transformed not only the politics but
the math of bargaining in the WTO.").
239. See SHEILA PAGE, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN GATT/WTO NEGOTIATIONS
13, 16 (Overseas Dev. Inst., Working Paper, Oct. 2001), available at http://www
.odi.org.uk/iedg/participation in negotiations/wto-gatt.pdf (last visited Mar. 10,
2003).
240. See INTERNATIONAL-WTO REFORM, supra note 234 ("The WTO covers
a far wider range of subjects that the GATT."). "The degree of intrusiveness into
domestic sovereignty [in the WTO] bears little resemblance to the shallow
integration of the GATT with its focus on border barriers and its buffers to
safeguard domestic policy space." OSTRY, supra note 161, at 3. "The




Round, there has not been a single major round of
multilateral trade negotiations at which one or more
countries have not threatened to exercise the right of veto
and block the entire negotiation process unless their
demands were satisfied."1 The Uruguay Round, for
example, was launched only after several prior unsuccessful
attempts.242 Moreover, after the establishment of the WTO,
it has often proved unable to arrive at a consensus, some
times stumbling even over decisions on routine procedural
issues.244
One emphatic example of the failure of consensus in the
WTO is the election of its second Director General. As the
first Director General of the WTO, Renato Ruggiero, was
stepping down in April 1999,245 there were two primary
candidates to fill this position-Mike Moore of New Zealand
and Supachai Panitchpakdi of Thailand.246 When the time
came to make a decision, the members of the WTO found
themselves hopelessly split,247 with developed countries
backing Moore and developing countries favoring Su-
pachai. 48 A search for consensus that had been going on for
241. See Steinberg, supra note 173, at 351-54 (discussing the difficulties of
launching a new round under the rule of consensus).
242. See Deardorff & Stern, supra note 185, at 420 ("In the early 1980s, the
United States ... failed to initiate a new round .... Later, with the Uruguay
Round underway, negotiations collapsed several times, with no apparent hope
of being restarted.").
243. See OXFAM, supra note 218, at 1 ("Since the WTO came into being in
1995 [and up to 2000], it has not proved capable of reaching consensus on a
significant issue of substance."); ODELL, supra note 228, at 26 ("The WTO, as a
forum for new multilateral agreements, ha[d] been deadlocked [from] 1997 [to
20011.").
244. See OSTRY, supra note 161, at 11 ("As the negotiations on Doha proceed
the examples of paralysis of decision-making concerning even the most trivial
matters are growing apace.").
245. See ODELL, supra note 228, at 10 ("Director General Renato Ruggiero
announced he would step down effective 30 April 1999.").
246. See id. ("[M]embers lined up behind two main candidates: Mr. Mike
Moore, former Trade Minister of New Zealand, and Dr. Supachai Panitchoakdi,
Thailand's Deputy Prime Minister and Commerce Minister.").
247. See Wilkinson, supra note 137, at 415 ("A lack of clear consensus saw
the WTO's membership split behind two candidates-Mike Moore of New
Zealand, and Supachai Panitchakdi of Thailand."). The split was very close,
with sixty-two delegations supporting Moore, and fifty-nine other delegations
supporting Supachai. See ODELL, supra note 228, at 10.
248. See Wilkinson, supra note 137, at 415 ("Much of the industrial North,
and in particular the United States, offered its support to Moore, whereas the
South tended to align itself with Supachai.").
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four month proved fruitless.2 49 Faced with the prospect of
having no Director General at all, the members of the WTO
finally accepted a compromise-appointing each of the two
candidates to a three-year term, to be served conse-
cutively.5 °
The frustration with the prolonged stalemate over the
election of the second Director General of the WTO had
negatively affected the preparation for the Third Minis-
terial Conference in Seattle.5 1 Once again, due to their
inability to reach consensus-this time on the decision to
launch a new round of multilateral trade negotiations-the
members of the WTO found themselves in a deadlock.2 2
In 2001, at the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha,
a new round of multilateral trade negotiations was finally
launched. 53 Impressed by this outcome, a number of
249. See ODELL, supra note 228, at 11 ("Heated, insulting rhetoric flew in
the General Council and the meeting ended with no consensus and no Director
general in office for four months."); Wilkinson, supra note 137, at 415 ("A
stalemate ensued that ensured that the successor was not appointed until four
months after the end of Ruggiero's tenure (which finished at the end of April
1999).").
250. See Alan S. Alexandroff, The Road to Seattle, POLY OPTIONS, Nov. 1999,
at 24, 26 ("[T]he members countries underscored the WTO's chronic inability to
decide by, as it were, cutting the baby in half: Moore will serve out half the DG
term, starting immediately. Supachai will take over on September 2002 and
serve through August 2005, and neither candidate will be eligible for re-
appointment."), available at http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/nov99/alexandr.pdf
(last visited Mar. 10, 2003); Wilkinson, supra note 137, at 415 ("The
entrenchment of positions was such that a solution was reached only after a
decision was taken to appoint both candidates to the post for two consecutive
terms fixed at three years each instead of the normal four.").
251. See Alexandroff, supra note 250, at 14 ("The long spat over the DG's job
distracted WTO officials who should have been focusing exclusively on
preparations for Seattle and the new round."). See also ODELL, supra note 228,
at 26 ("The fight over the DG succession, besides delaying the drafting, had also
left two key mediators-the General Council Chair and the new Director
General-in remarkably weak positions to lead divided members to a
consensus.").
252. See, e.g., SCOTT SINCLAIR, THE WTO: WHAT HAPPENED IN SEATTLE?
WHAT'S NEXT IN GENEVA 1 (Canadian Ctr. for Pol'y Alternatives, Briefing Paper
Series: Trade & Inv., Feb. 7, 2000) ("The World Trade Organization (WTO)
Third Ministerial meeting ended in collapse. Ministers and Negotiators were
unable to reach agreement on a draft declaration that would have set the
agenda for a new round of negotiations and work program at the WTO."),
available at http:l www.policyalternatives.ca/publications/brief2.pdf (last
visited Mar. 10, 2003).
253. See, e.g., Mike Moore, Foreword to WORLD TRADE ORG., THE ROAD TO
DOHA AND BEYOND-A ROAD MAP FOR SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDING THE DOHA
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commentators have rushed to declare the crisis created by
the failure at the Third Ministerial Conference was over.
However, while it is true that, compared to the failure in
Seattle, the decisions taken in Doha were definitely a step
forward, its success could, at least in part, have been due to
the unique circumstances surrounding the Fourth
Ministerial Conference. First, it appears that, in Doha,
much more than just a new round of multilateral trade
negotiations was at stake-the viability of the WTO itself
was being tested.55  Second, the Fourth Ministerial
Conference was held at the time of a big economic recession
throughout the world. 6 And, finally, the tragic events of
September 11 created a sense of unity among the members
of the WTO.257 These unique circumstances have arguably
led to softening of positions, making negotiators more
willing to make considerable compromises. Later in the new
round, however, these favorable factors are unlikely to be
present, and the WTO is likely to face consensus-building
problems similar to those it faced in Seattle again.
Not surprisingly, there by now appears to be a broad
agreement, both among the WTO members and com-
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 7 (2002) [herinafter WORLD TRADE ORG.] (speaking of
"[tihe successful launch of a new Trade Round at Doha"), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp-e/ roadtodoha e.pdf (last visited Mar.
10, 2003).
254. See id. ("The successful launch of a new Trade Round at Doha brought
to an end the uncertainty, loss of momentum and lack of confidence created by
the frustrating failure at Seattle two years earlier.").
255. See id. at 9 ("A Second failure would have fatally weakened the WTO:
the question would have been posed whether it had become impossible, given
the... greatly expanded membership [of the WTO] and the huge disparities
among Members, to move the Organization forward through our consensus
mechanism.")
256. The world economic scenario was looking gloomy at the time. Taiwan,
Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and Hong Kong were all suffering from an
economic slowdown. Amit Dasgupta, Make or Break at Doha, HIMAL SOUTH
ASIAN, Oct. 2001, available at http://www.himalmag.com/october2001/analysis
_l.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2003). Japan was in stagnation. Europe faced a
worse-than-anticipated GDP growth in the twelve countries that share the
Euro. Id. Latin America, plagued with its own financial problems, was finding
the prospects of recovery remote, and looked to the US for a bailout. Id.
257. See, e.g., High stakes at Doha, ECONOMIST, Nov. 3, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis
Library, News Group File ("[Sluccess at Doha, in Qatar, has become part of the
anti-terrorist arsenal."); Guy de Jonquieres, Dealing in Doha, FIN. TIMES, Nov.
6, 2001, at 24. See also NEW WTO ROUND: UNICE FACT SHEETS 5 (2001) ("After
11 September 2001, effective international cooperation and governance are
more than ever necessary in all relevant areas.").
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mentators, that the WTO is in dire need for institutional
reform.258 The extent of such reform, however, has been a
subject of much disagreement. This Part examines the
merits of several of the more popular proposals for
decisions-making reform for the WTO, dividing them
broadly into consensus-based and voting-based.
A. Consensus
1. The Rule of Consensus in the Committee of the. Whole.
The position taken by a majority of the members of the
WTO and commentators appears to be that its decision-
making needs to be reformed without departing from the
rule of consensus in the committee of the whole. '59
According to this position, it is not so much the principle of
consensus itself as the manner in which it has been
traditionally built that has led to the crisis.60 The criticism
thus focuses on the Green Room process, characterizing it
as undemocratic for, among other things, its lack of
inclusiveness and transparency.26 '
258. See SINCLAIR, supra note 252, at 7 ("[Wlhile, because of the Seattle
result, no new negotiation topics were agreed to, there is a broad consensus that
institutional reform and decision-making must now be addressed and Director-
General Moore was directed to consult with member governments on this
matter.").
259. See U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (2000), supra note 203, at 36
("[U]nlike other international institutions, the WTO is and should remain an
inter-governmental, member-driven institution, whose Members take decisions
on the basis of consensus."). See also Supachai, supra note 233, at 32-33 ("It is
often said that the consensus principle is at the heart of the WTO system, and
is a fundamental democratic guarantee that is not negotiable.").
260. See U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (2000), supra note 203, at 36 ("The
United States will work with its trading partners to improve the WTO's
operation..., without disturbing the fundamental requirement of decision-
making by consensus."); Supachai, supra note 233, at 33, ("[It appears that
radical reform might not be necessary. Rather, the practice of decision-making
by consensus should prevail and be maintained with simply some fine-tuning.").
261. See, e.g., FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, AUSTRALIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO) 36 (September 2000), available at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/wto/aust wto.pdf ("Members have
recognised the need to ensure that the WTO's internal processes are sufficiently
inclusive and transparent for all Members."); GLASSMAN, supra note 166 (noting
that "[t]he WTO has also been accused of being undemocratic and of making
decisions 'behind the closed doors' "); Supachai, supra note 233, at 32 ("An
effective consensus-based decision-making process could be achieved by
increasing the transparency with which decisions are taken."). But see How to
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In the WTO, the rule of consensus may be defended on
a number of general grounds.262 Most significantly, this
procedure protects state sovereignty because, in contrast to
the win-or-lose situation represented by voting, consensus
results in decisions that produce "no losers who lose face." '263
As a consequence, decisions have stronger moral and
political force, and their implementation is improved.
In the specific case of the WTO, moreover, there is
another very strong reason why any proposal calling for
deviation from the rule of consensus is usually regarded as
controversial."4 It is simply that most members of the WTO
are opposed to any modification of this rule." For developed
countries, the rule of consensus is valuable because it
ensures that they will not be outvoted by developing
countries, which, at least under the present one nation-one
state system, constitute a clear majority in the WTO. As to
developing countries, they argue for the retention of
consensus-based decision-making because of their fear that
any other rule will cause developed countries to withdraw
from the organization and take their demands to another
forum where developing countries have lesser or no
presentation at all.266
Despite this seemingly universal support for the rule of
consensus, there are nevertheless some serious questions as
to its efficiency of in the context of the WTO.2 The main
criticism is that, in many cases, it is unrealistic to achieve
no formal objection from its 145 members, many of which
have conflicting interests.2 68 The majority supporting the
Reform the WTO to Level the Playing Field, ECON. REFORM TODAY (2000)
(Willard A. Workman, Vice President, CIPE & Vice President, International,
US Chamber of Commerce, arguing that "[tihe tag that the WTO is undemo-
cratic is just a red herring"), available at http://www.cipe.org/publications/fs/ert/
current/e35_04. htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
262. See supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
263. GLASSMAN, supra note 166.
264. See Liam Halligan, It's Time to Rewrite Rules at the WTO, SUNDAY
Bus., Jan. 23, 2000, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File (noting that
"[vioting at the WTO is a controversial idea").
265. NARLIKAR, supra note 25, at 14.
266. Id. at 14-15.
267. See, e.g., Alexandroff, supra note 250, at 25 ("Consensual decision-
making... had a direct impact... on the WTO's effectiveness as an
institution .... ).
268. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22. See also PAUL BRENTON, THE
FUTURE OF THE WTO AND THE NEW TRADE ROUND 2 (Ctr. for Eur. Pol'y Stud.,
Task Force Report No. 36, 2001) (noting that consensus was much more difficult
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retention of consensus-based decision-making argues, how-
ever, that this problem is more properly resolved without
departing from the rule of consensus-by making the
process more democratic, increasing its inclusiveness and
transparency.269
The argument for the retention of the rule of consensus
in the WTO while democratizing its decision-making by
increasing its inclusiveness and transparency is, in a sense,
ironic because, by its very nature, consensus building is not
a very public process. 2 ° Its success, however limited it may
be, owes much to private consultations among the key
decision makers. Not surprisingly, in GATT 1947 and now
the WTO, consensus has normally been built through the
Green Room process.
In the final analysis, while increasing inclusiveness and
transparency of the WTO procedures is clearly a desirable
change, such a change cannot be implemented without
reference to its overall decision-making scheme. More
fundamentally, even if the decision-making in the WTO is
more inclusive and transparent, it still leaves the root of the
problem-the rule of consensus, requiring no objection from
145 diverse members to take a decision-intact.
2. The Executive Board. Several members of the WTO
and commentators have proposed to facilitate consensus
building through the creation of an Executive Board. The
most comprehensive proposal, which was prepared by the
Commission of the EU, included both short-term and long-
term reforms of decision-making in the WTO.271 In the short
term, among other things, the Commission proposed
"[e]stablishing an 'Eminent Persons Group' to assist the
Director General to analyse institutional issues and make
to achieve because "a sense of a shared vision on broad long-tern objectives and
how the world trading system should develop" is lacking among the member-
states of the GATT/WTO); Schott & Watal, supra note 21, at 284 (noting that
"the process of 'consensus-building' has broken down" due to the great
expansion of WTO membership).
269. See supra text accompanying notes 259-61.
270. See GLASSMAN, supra note 166 ("It is true that that WTO decision-
making is not open to the public, but whether this is good or bad is not clear....
Consensus-building is a slow process that is, by its nature, not very public.").
271. See OXFAM, supra note 218, at 10 ("The most fully-developed proposal
has come from the European Commission, which has released a strategy
document on short and long-term reforms at the WTO.").
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recommendation to the Membership. 2 72 In the longer term,
it suggested "[e]stablishing a 'Consultative Group,' of
limited membership, including capital-based officials, that
would have 'no decision-making powers, but which could
advise the Director General and, where appropriate,
present recommendation to the General Council.'
Canada, in turn, has supported the idea of an Executive
Board modeled after the Security Council of the UN.274
Another, albeit more informal, proposal, which came from
Japan, favored the creation of an "Advisory Group"-"a
body of limited membership that might help Members to
agree priorities for negotiation."275 Finally, ,Mexico proposed
a so-called "Glass Room," in which a quarter of the WTO
members would build consensus.276
The idea of an Executive Board has received much
attention from commentators as well. Thus, in a 2000
interview, the present Director General of the WTO,
Supachai Panitchpakdi, "risked [his] neck" to suggest that
"maybe we need an executive board for WTO like they have
at the IMF. 2 77 He also supported the idea of an "Eminent
Persons Group" ("EPG")-"An EPG has worked well for...
[the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum]. An.EPG can
set certain directions. They would help steer the whole
organization. With WTO an EPG might evolve into an
executive board in the future.
2 171
272. Id. See also Supachai, supra note 233, at 34 ("Prime Minister Tony
Blair has already suggested the appointment of a group of eminent persons to
advise the General Council on the future path of the WTO.").
273. OXFAM, supra note 218, at 11. •
274. See Fergus Watt, Does the WTO Need a Parliamentary Assembly? A
Survey of Post-Seattle Talks and Developments, MONDIAL, Apr. 2000, at 6, 6
("Some have offered the idea that the WTO needs some sort of representative
executive body. Canada's Trade Minister Pierre Pettigrew offered his support,
although he drew an unfortunate comparison to the UN Security Council
(Please, Pierre, no vetoes!).").
275. OXFAM, supra note 218, at 10.
276. See NARLIKAR, supra note 25, at 16 ("Mexico has suggested a
transformation of the Green Room into a 'Glass Room', in which 25% of the
WTO's members (34 at the time of the proposal) would participate.").
Under the proposal, the Glass Room would have fifteen permanent members,
selected with reference to the greatest shares in world trade, and nineteen other
members, "chosen according to regional criteria." Id.
277. Supachai Panitchpakdi, Fixing the WTO, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 20,
2000, at 34, 34.
278. Id. See also Supachai, supra note 233, at 33-34 ("Although the idea of
an executive board has not found favour with members in the past, the time
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Several other commentators have made the argument
that an Executive Board arrangement "could be the most
promising mechanism for balancing decision-making
efficiency and the requirement of consensus."27 ' Underlying
this argument -is a simple idea-the WTO needs a smaller
body of approximately twenty members, selected based on
"a combination of geographical balance [and] importance to
the multilateral trading system (as measured by trade
volume) 1180 in order to streamline its decision-making
process.
At first blush, the proposals of the members of the WTO
and commentators may appear to be similar to the ITO,
which was also expected to have an Executive Board of
limited membership.282 The parallel, however, stops there.
All proposals make it clear that the new Executive Board,
unlike the one planned for the ITO, would not have any
decision-making powers. 83 In other words, the final step in
adopting a decision would still have to be made by the
entire membership of the WTO.284
Instead, the new Executive Board, as proposed, would
be more like the Consultative Group of Eighteen
established by the Council in 1975 in an attempt to "involve
officials at senior or political level from the capitals in the
may come when such a concept, with appropriate modifications, will be the most
effective way of managing the WTO.").
279. Sutherland & Sewell, supra note 236, at 99.
280. Id. at 100.
281. See, e.g., Schott & Watal, supra note 21, at 286 ("Simply put, the WTO
needs to establish a small, informal steering committee (20 or so in number)
that can be delegated responsibility for developing consensus on trade issues
among the member countries."); Richard H. Steinberg, Great Power
Management of the World Trading System: A Transatlantic Strategy for Liberal
Multilateralism, 29 L. & POLY INT'L Bus. 205, 254 (1998) ("Creation of an
executive committee could provide a useful forum for regularized menegement
of the WTO.").
282. See supra text accompanying notes 158-62.
283. See NARLIKAR, supra note 25, at 16 ("All of these proposals stress the
advisory/executive/consultative/steering board or committee would have only
consensus-building and no decision-making powers."); OXFAM, supra note 218,
at 11 (noting that the "Consultative Group" proposed by the Commission of the
EU would have "no decision-making powers").
284. See Sutherland & Sewell, supra note 236, at 100 ("The executive
committee would not have authority to make final decisions on behalf of other




work of the GATT. 285 The Group was intended as a policy
discussion forum and was purely consultative in nature.
Its mandate specifically provided that it "shall not impinge
upon the competence or authority of the CONTRACTING
PARTIES or of the Council and shall not assume, or detract
from, any of the of the decision-making responsibilities of
these two bodies or of the permanent GATT Committees."87
The Group was suspended in 1989, however, and has not
been revived ever since.288 This fact suggests a lack of
interest on the part of the members in establishing a
similar body within the WTO.289
There are several major problems with the Executive
Board idea that suggest that this alternative may not be
appropriate. First, many developing countries oppose it
because they see it as formalization of the current Green
Room process.29 ° Second, and more importantly, as, under
all of the proposals, the Executive Board would not be given
any decision-making powers, it is unlikely to resolve the
source of the problem-at the end of the day, it is still
necessary to convince 145 members not to object to a
decision before it can be taken.
B. Majority Voting
1. Simple Majority under a One Nation-One Vote
System. If the rule of consensus is no longer a viable
decision-making procedure for the WTO, then the first
285. GATT Secretariat, supra note 27, para. 1.
286. See NARLIKAR, supra note 25, at 16 ("[T]he group operated at the level
of senior officials and provided an opportunity to improve coordination of
policies between the national capitals and Geneva."); OSTRY, supra note 161, at
12 ("Its purpose was to provide a forum for senior officials from capitals to
discuss policy issues .... ").
287. GATT Secretariat, supra note 27, para. 2. The Council specifically
changed the title of the Group from the originally proposed "Management
Group" to "Consultative Group" to reflect its intention that "this should not be a
decision-making body." Id. para. 11.
288. NARLIKAR, supra note 25, at 16.
289. See id. ("The fact that the group was not revived.., might indicate
that its formula does not necessarily allow the hope that is invested in it in
some accounts today.").
290. See id. at 17 ("[Als one group of developing countries has noted,
'Creation of an advisory board would formalise the exclusion of a large number
of Members from process fo consultations."); OXFAM, supra note 218, at 11 ("At
its worst, [an Executive Board] could achieve little more than the formalisation
of the Green Room process.").
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alternative that comes to mind is simple majority voting
under a one nation-one vote system. This, in essence, is the
fallback rule expressly provided for in the Marrakesh
Agreement. 91 Thus, its adoption is not going to require
going thought the extremely difficult amendment process.
In the context of the WTO, however, the simplicity of
adopting the simple majority rule appears to be its only
advantage. Under the present one nation-one vote system, a
concurrence of seventy-three out of 145 members would be
enough to take a decision. This would necessarily lead to
fears that decisions so taken would discriminate against the
key members, including the United States and the EU, and
undercut their sovereignty. For this reason, unacceptable
for developed countries, simple majority voting would make
the key members better off withdrawing from the WTO.292
Without their participation, the WTO would be effectively
dead.
2. Qualified, Weighted Majority Voting. Finally, if the
rule of consensus and simple majority voting are not viable
decision-making alternatives for the WTO, it may decide by
a weighted, qualified majority. A few commentators have
supported this alternative. One early proposal came in a
1976 report of the Panel on International Trade Policy and
Institutions established by the American Society of
International Law. 93 In the report, the Panel recommended
"re-making the system of international cooperation in
trade" by establishing a "World Trade Organization.2 94 Its
voting procedure, while respecting some non-power
characteristics, was to "be designed so that decisions of the
group basically reflect the economic contribution and
importance of the participants."' 9'
More recently, several other commentators have
supported the idea of qualified, weighted majority voting in
the WTO. For example, Aileen Kwa has argued that, in
291. See WTO Agreement art. IX:1 ("Except as otherwise provided, where a
decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue shall be decided
by... a majority of the votes cast .... ).
292. See NARLIKAR, supra note 25, at 14-15.
293. AM. SOCY INT'L LAW, RE-MAKING THE SYSTEM OF WORLD TRADE: A
PROPOSAL FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM (1976).
294. Id. at 1, 6.
295. Id. at 27.
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certain circumstances, a weighted voting system would
benefit developing countries.296
There are several important advantages that decision-
making by qualified, weighted majority has vis-A-vis the
other alternatives. First, the weighting of votes, by
realistically reflecting the relative place of each individual
member in international trade, avoids the problem of
tyranny of the majority.297 The key members would probably
have to be given enough votes to have the right of veto.
Second, the flexibility of this rule would also allow the WTO
to set the percentagie of votes cast necessary to constitute a
qualified majority."8 Together with distribution of votes,
this flexibility could be used to protect the interests of
developing countries. Admittedly, unlike with the rule of
consensus, these countries would have no right of veto.
However, the system could be so designed that a sufficient
number of developing countries, voting in concert, be able to
block a decision they oppose.
CONCLUSION
The EU provides an example of an organization where
relaxation of decision-making procedures played an
important role in successful development of economic
integration. It appears that its departure from decision-
making by consensus to allow qualified majority voting in
an increasing number of substantive areas resulted form
two major factors. First, qualified majority provides for
more efficient decision-making. Second, wider application of
qualified majority voting was viewed as essential to the
viability of the EU as new members joined it and new
substantive areas of cooperation were added.
By contrast, the WTO has shown-and is still
showing-considerable reluctance to any modification of its
decision-making procedure based on consensus. The two
factors that prompted reform of the decision-making
process in the EU are even more compelling in the case of
the 145-member WTO. Nevertheless, most members
296. See Penny Fowler, WTO Institutional Reform: Taking Stock of
Proposals Made So Far, SEATINI BULL., Mar. 15, 2000, available at
http://www.seatini. org/bulletins/b03-05.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
297. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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continue to resist any deviation from the current rule of
consensus. Consequently, any short and medium term
modifications of the decision-making procedures in the
WTO, including such measures as increasing transparency
and inclusiveness, are likely take place within the
framework of decision-making by consensus. As the EU
experience suggests, however, as a long-term development,
consensus in the WTO needs to be replaced by weighted,
qualified majority voting.

